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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/ABSTRACT 
 
Currently, companies are taxed on an individual basis in South Africa and there is no provision for the 
offsetting of profits and losses of different companies within a tax group. Admittedly, businesses have 
the option to operate under a single divisionalised entity whereby they are able to enjoy offsetting 
profit and losses of trades of different divisions within such an entity. There are however, strong 
business reasons as to why businesses split themselves into separate legal entities. The most 
noteworthy benefit being the ability to manage business risk through limited liability provisions 
contained in corporate legislation.  
Arguments have been put forward to the effect that groups, although legally separated through 
different corporate entities, operate in much the same way as a divisionalised single entity business 
does. The current tax treatment, which taxes entities of a group on their individual taxable incomes, 
is therefore argued to not provide a true assessment of the group’s tax position. Arguments in the 
Margo Commission of Inquiry report have even gone as far as saying that it seems unfair to tax 
profitable entities in a group while the overall taxable income of the group may be negative.  
With the above in mind, the question of whether a group tax system would be suitable for 
implementation in South Africa is brought to the table. As will be seen in this dissertation, there are 
strong opinions on either side of determining whether a group tax system would be appropriate for 
South Africa. Opinions in favour of a group tax system view the system as a potential tool to encourage 
business through more favourable tax conditions thereby encouraging growth and development of 
the economy. Drawbacks of the system include the perceived loss to the fiscus as tax relief is provided 
while concerns have also been raised relating to the current ability of the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) to cope with the implementation of such a change to legislation.  
The author of this dissertation acknowledges the need for South Africa to maximise its revenue 
collection to meet its budgetary obligations. However, at the same time, the author is of the view that 
government should look to creating environments in which smaller businesses may develop and grow, 
potentially increasing revenue collection in the long run in any event. For these reasons, the author 
has taken a conservative approach to explore the idea of providing for a group tax system for tightly‐
held tax groups with a limited turnover. This could potentially have the effect of developing small 
businesses while limiting the exposure of the fiscus to a revenue collection reduction. Loosely defined, 
tightly‐held groups of companies refer to groups where there is a close relation between shareholders 
of the group.  
Further to this, the author highlights the challenges that small businesses face in moving towards a 
group structure to derive the benefits that have been identified in this dissertation.  With that in mind, 
the author has looked to encouraging group formation in small businesses by attempting to relieve 
some of the challenges that small businesses encounter in trying to establish a group structure.  
Through this dissertation, the author proposes a group tax system whereby only tightly‐held qualifying 
groups will be allowed to participate. The proposal contained within the dissertation has been drafted 
after assessing the findings of the preceding chapters as well as adapting some of the implementation 
provisions provided by the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) tax 
legislation.  
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This ability to produce a suitable proposal for implementation in South Africa will be a step towards 
concluding on whether South African tax legislators should be looking to implement a group tax 
system whereby tightly‐held groups of companies will be the initial qualifying audience.   
The conclusion drawn through the research conducted is that steps should be taken towards the 
implementation of group tax for tightly‐held groups of companies. A stumbling block, however, as 
identified in the interim Nugent Commission report, is the current state that SARS finds itself in. It 
would seem reckless to recommend the instatement of a provision of this stature while SARS is in its 
current state. It is thus concluded, that movement towards a group tax system for tightly‐held groups 
of companies should be delayed until such time that SARS has re‐established itself as a proficient organ 
of the state.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
In terms of South Africa’s current tax legislation, South Africa does not have a formal group tax system 
in place1. Each company is required to submit and file its own tax returns and is liable for its own tax 
affairs2.  
There have been calls for a group tax system to be instated in South Africa3. Commissions of Inquiry 
have been set up to provide guidance on tax reform which included analysis on this matter, the 
findings of which will be discussed in chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
Internationally, many of the developed countries such as the United States of America (USA), the 
United Kingdom (UK), Australia and much of Europe have adopted a system of group tax. South Africa 
has not yet adopted a formal group tax system for a number of reasons which will be discussed. It 
does appear though, by the fact that many developed countries have already adopted a group tax 
system and with regard to the many calls for it, that group tax is a tax reform mechanism that South 
African tax legislators may be considering. 
With this background in mind, an investigation will be conducted to investigate whether South Africa 
should implement a group taxation system that will initially be applicable only to a few tightly‐held 
qualifying corporate groups of companies (groups). Tightly‐held4 qualifying groups can loosely be 
defined as South African resident groups of companies where there are close relationships between 
its shareholders5. 
 
1.2. OVERVIEW 
 
Businesses are generally discouraged from entering into corporate group formation by the 
burdensome compliance requirements and associated costs that accompany it. Currently, each entity 
within a tax group is required to fulfil its own individual tax compliance requirements. This includes 
submitting their own income tax returns and being liable for the resultant tax liability. These 
burdensome requirements play a part in depriving smaller businesses of the potential benefits 
associated with corporate groups as they may see the associated costs of forming and maintaining a 
group as beyond their reach. The burdensome compliance requirements are highlighted further when 
considering the need to conform to VAT requirements as well.  
                                                            
1 Davis Tax Committee: Review of South Africa’s Corporate Income Tax System: March 2018. (DTC Report) 
Page 74. 
2 Section 210 of The Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. 
3 DTC Report: Pages 76 to 77 
4 This is a term that will be formally defined in chapter 2 of this paper.  
5 In this context, shareholders are South African resident individuals who are required to have a direct family 
relationship with each other. 
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What has prevailed is that the larger corporations, which have the necessary resources and can afford 
to, form and maintain group structures, which allow them to derive advantages over their smaller, 
less established counterparts. The benefits associated with a group structure will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 2.  
Further to this and perhaps more importantly, businesses choose not to expand into group structures 
due to the lack of tax loss‐sharing provisions in the current legislation. In a divisionalised entity, profits 
and losses of various trades conducted within a single entity may be set‐off against each other. This, 
however, is not the case where different trades are conducted through separate corporate entities, 
even though the entities may form part of the same group of companies6.  
This means that, barring the limited relief provided by the corporate rules7, South African companies 
are taxed individually on the income they earn, regardless of whether they form part of a group or 
not.  
As noted in the Davis Tax Committee (DTC) report, which will be discussed in the coming chapters, tax 
legislation should not be implemented with only increasing revenue collection in mind. Tax legislation 
should also be implemented to encourage and stimulate growth8.  
 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
With the above background and overview in mind, the author aims to answer the following principle 
research question: 
“Would it be beneficial for South Africa to incorporate a group tax system into its legislation that will, 
initially, only be aimed at tightly‐held qualifying groups?” 
As a secondary research investigation, the author will, through the research conducted, propose a 
suitable group tax provision for implementation in South Africa. As suggested in the primary research 
question, the proposal will be aimed at tightly‐held qualifying groups of companies.  
Aside from the core objectives, associated with group tax which will be discussed in chapter 3, the 
proposal will aim to achieve the following subsidiary objectives: 
 Encourage group formation through reduced compliance requirements and more favourable 
taxing conditions; 
 Encourage business activity by providing more favourable conditions in which to conduct 
business; 
 Encourage and promote the longevity of businesses; 
 Provide South Africa with an entry into group taxation without over‐exposing the fiscus to 
reduction in revenue collection. 
A proposal will be provided in chapter 8 and will be assessed in terms of the core objectives of group 
tax as well as the subsidiary objectives provided above.  
                                                            
6 Defined in Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Tax Act). 
7 Sections 41 to 47 of the Tax Act (The corporate rules is discussed in further detail in chapter 4 of this 
dissertion 
8 DTC Report: Page 77 
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Consequent upon the outcomes which arise from performing the research to answer the above 
research question and provide a potential proposed group tax option, included in the conclusion of 
the dissertation will be a recommendation on whether or not to implement the group tax proposal 
into South African tax legislation.  
 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The author will follow a doctrinal method of investigative research in completion of this dissertation. 
The research will delve into the opinions and recommendations of the relevant Commissions of 
Inquiry, professional opinions and current tax legislation to conclude on the research question posed.  
Further to this, an investigation into the mechanics of group tax provisions implemented in other 
countries will be conducted to assist in drafting this dissertation’s group tax proposal.  
 
1.5. LIMITATIONS OF SCOPE 
 
The dissertation will be limited to income tax consequences, however, references to other taxes in 
terms of South African tax legislation may be made without being a key focus. Attention will be placed 
on the main objectives of group tax, which include profit and loss offsetting and the tax neutral 
transfer of assets between group entities9. Intra‐group loans and the resulting interest fall outside the 
scope of this dissertation.   
As alluded to in the earlier parts of this chapter, the focus of this dissertation will be on South African 
resident corporate groups. As a result, non‐resident companies will not be looked at, albeit that 
references may be made to them throughout this dissertation.  Further to this, as indicated in the 
research question, only tightly held qualifying groups will be addressed and not groups in general. 
The findings relating to the Nugent Commission will be limited to what is contained within the interim 
report, as at the time of research, the final report had not been published.    
 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
This dissertation will follow a comprehensive structural process that delves into various areas that 
provide relevant insight to assist in drafting a suitable group tax proposal and, thereafter, a conclusion 
to the research question posed above.  A brief summary of each chapter is provided, below, outlining 
its core purpose in the dissertation leading up to the conclusion in the final chapter.  
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 aims to identify the benefits of groups that smaller businesses may be missing out on as a 
result of them possibly not being able to afford the associated costs of operating as groups. The 
concept of “Groups” will be introduced in terms of the different definitions provided by the various 
legislation applicable in South Africa. Groups, in terms of the different legislation, have different 
                                                            
9 DTC Report: Page 67 
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implications. For this reason, it has been deemed necessary to include the various definitions in this 
dissertation.  Further to this, the proposed definition of a tightly‐held group of companies will be 
formally introduced in this chapter which will be the audience of the group tax proposal in chapter 8.  
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 formally introduces the concept of group tax to the dissertation. It investigates the 
perceived benefits and drawbacks of group tax in order to assess the necessity of implementing a 
group tax system in South Africa. The chapter will follow on to identify and explain some of the 
different models available by which group tax may be implemented.  
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 analyses the existing set of corporate rules10 and provides a summary of the corporate tax 
relief currently provided by legislation. The chapter will go on further to assess whether there are 
group tax elements that exist within the corporate rules. What follows is an assessment as to whether 
the current provisions are sufficient to meet the objectives as set out in the research question which 
would render the objectives of group tax redundant.   
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 will summarise and examine the findings of the reports provided by previous Commissions 
of Inquiry with regard to their views and recommendations on group taxation. The Margo Commission, 
the Katz Commission and the Davis Tax committee all included a study into group tax in their reports.  
The chapter will draw out the findings which will be of benefit in drafting a suitable proposal for group 
tax in South Africa and thereafter assist in reaching a conclusion on the research question.  
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 investigates the less formal opinions in the form of publicly available articles either written 
by professionals and key members of the industry, or articles in which they have been quoted. The 
insight attained from these articles will be extracted in pursuit of adding to the evidence required to 
provide a conclusion to the research question.  
Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 investigates the provisions that are present within the UK and the USA group tax systems in 
order to provide a guideline for drafting the proposal in this dissertation. The rationale for these 
countries’ selection will be expanded upon in the chapter.    
Chapter 8 
Chapter 8 provides a group tax proposal for South Africa that will attempt to meet the core objectives 
associated with group tax, as well as the subsidiary objectives as set out in section 1.3 above.  
Chapter 9 
Chapter 9 looks into the current state of affairs at the South Africa Revenue Services (SARS) as 
provided by the Nugent Interim Report11. The findings of the report will provide a formalised 
assessment into the current condition and capabilities of SARS. While this will not directly contribute 
                                                            
10 Sections 41 to 47 of the Tax Act 
11Interim Report: Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Administration and Governance by the South African 
Revenue Service: September 2018. Judge R Nugent (Nugent Commission Report) 
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to the conclusion of the research question, it may affect the timing of implementation should it be 
concluded that a group tax system be recommended for South Africa.    
Chapter 10 
Chapter 10 concludes the dissertation by providing an answer to the research question as posed in 
this chapter. It will include a recommendation as to whether the proposal drafted in chapter 8 should 
be implemented in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. GROUPS 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although formally introduced in the next section, group structures can loosely be defined to be a set 
of corporate entities with a common owner entity that together form a “group”.  Groups are an 
important tool used by businesses to separate trades under the same ownership. As will be seen 
below, there are benefits and drawbacks of group structures. This chapter will highlight the 
importance of groups and hence the rationale for wanting to encourage their formation.  
The definition of tightly‐held groups, a concept introduced by this dissertation, will be formally 
presented in this chapter as well.   
 
2.2. GROUP DEFINITIONS 
 
In South Africa, there are at least three different definitions of “groups” provided by different 
statutory bodies applicable for different purposes. These definitions appear in: 
 The South African Companies Act12;  
 The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS);  
 The South African Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Tax Act).13 
A simplified14 conceptual summary of each definition is provided below.  
 
2.2.1. THE COMPANIES ACT  
 
In terms of the Companies Act, a group of companies is defined as two or more companies that share 
a holding company15 or subsidiary16 relationship. In order for this relationship to exist, the holding 
company must be able to exercise control over its subsidiary. Control is generally attained through an 
equity shareholding of at least 51%17.  
 
 
                                                            
12 Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act) 
13 The Tax Act 
14 The definitions of groups in terms of the Companies Act and IFRS provided have been simplified for the 
purposes of this dissertation.  
15 Defined in Section 1 of the Companies Act 
16 Defined in Section 3(1)(a) of the Companies Act 
17 Section 2(2)(a)(ii)(aa) of the Companies Act 
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2.2.2. IFRS  
 
In terms of IFRS 10, a group is defined as a parent company and its subsidiaries. A parent is defined as 
a company that is able to exert control over another company (subsidiary). In order for a parent to 
exert control over a subsidiary it is, broadly, required to hold at least 51% of its voting rights, which 
generally translates to an equity shareholding of at least 51%18.  
 
2.2.3. THE TAX ACT 
 
In terms of section 1 of the Tax Act, a group of companies is defined as two or more companies in 
which one company (hereinafter referred to as the “controlling group company”) directly or indirectly 
holds shares in at least one other company (hereinafter referred to as the “controlled group 
company”), to the extent that— 
 at least 70 percent of the equity shares in each controlled group company are directly 
held by the controlling group company, one or more other controlled group 
companies or any combination thereof; and  
 the controlling group company directly holds at least 70 per cent of the equity shares 
in at least one controlled group company. 
 
This, however, is the general definition provided by the Tax Act. What may perhaps be of more 
significance to this dissertation is the definition provided under section 41 of the Act. Section 41 of 
the Act provides the rules and definitions for sections 42‐47 which contain, what are generally referred 
to as, the “corporate rules”. The corporate rules provide relief to companies in certain circumstances 
and are currently the closest that South African tax legislation has to a group taxation system. The 
corporate rules will, however, be analysed in chapter 4 of this dissertation. For now, details pertaining 
to the definition of a group as provided in section 41 will be extracted. 
The definition of a group in section 41 maintains the definition provided in section 1, however, it limits 
a corporate group of companies to only include South African tax resident companies as well as certain 
other restrictions which will not be discussed in this dissertation.  The limitation on resident companies 
means that, where companies are required to be part of the same group of companies to be able to 
benefit from relief provisions, foreign companies may only participate in certain specified 
circumstances19.  
As noted above, the tax definition, with particular reference to section 41 of the Tax Act, is significantly 
narrower than the definition provided by the Companies Act and the accounting standards. The result 
of this would generally imply that if a group meets the requirements of a group in terms of section 41 
of the Tax Act, it would likely also meet the requirements of the other statutory bodies. For that 
reason, it will be assumed that where the tax definition applies, the relevant entities will also qualify 
as being part of a group in terms of the Companies Act and for purposes of the accounting standards.    
 
                                                            
18 IFRS 10, page A537 ‐ 538 
19 These circumstances fall out of the scope of this dissertation.  
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2.3. TIGHTLY‐HELD GROUP 
 
As pointed out in the research question, the author will investigate the possibility of instating a group 
tax provision that would limit participation to tightly‐held groups.  
“Tightly‐held group” is a term that has not been defined in terms of any of the relevant statutory 
bodies but is formally defined for the specific purposes of this dissertation, below. 
2.3.1. TIGHTLY HELD GROUP – DEFINITION  
 
For the specific purposes of this dissertation a “tightly‐held group of companies” is defined as per the 
group definition provided in section 41 of the Act together with the following additional shareholding 
requirements: 
All shareholders and beneficiaries, where applicable, are required to be: 
 South African citizens, either through birth or naturalization; and 
 tax resident in South Africa. 
The parent company is required to be the ultimate parent company of the group with the following 
permissible forms of shareholding:  
a) Individual ownership 
This is where a single individual owns 100% of the equity shares of the parent company.  
b) Ownership of members of a family 
Direct members of a family may combine to hold 100% of the equity shares of the parent company. 
Where direct family members are defined within this dissertation is to include: 
 Parents  
 Children 
 Spouses20  
 Siblings 
The relationship may be to any of the shareholders. For example, where an individual is initially the 
sole owner and their spouse subsequently becomes a shareholder, the spouses direct family members 
may from thereon be permissible owners.  
c) Trust21 
The parent company may be owned by a trust where all the beneficiaries of the trust are direct family 
members as defined above. Ownership may also comprise a combination of trust and individuals, 
                                                            
20If there is a divorce, each shareholder and their allowable family members would remain eligible current and 
future shareholders.  
21 Section 1 of the Tax Act 
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provided the family member requirement is met. The trust itself will not be included in the group, but 
rather the group of companies that it owns. 
The rationale for the author’s specific focus on tightly‐held groups will be expanded on in chapter 8, 
where a group tax proposal will be drafted for South Africa.    
 
2.4. TAX GROUP STRUCTURES 
 
As indicated in chapter 1, corporate group structures provide a number of business benefits that 
businesses utilize to gain a competitive advantage in the market. These benefits are often not realised 
by smaller, tightly‐held businesses as they may find it difficult to endure the burdensome 
administration and compliance requirements associated with group structures.  Part of these 
requirements include the requirement to individually see to the tax compliance affairs of each of the 
member entities within the group. Smaller, tightly‐held businesses may view the compliance 
requirements of additional corporate entities as beyond the reach of their resources. As a result, these 
businesses are more likely to combine multiple trades under a single entity thereby restricting its 
ability to derive similar benefits to that of larger businesses who have the resources to meet the 
requirements of a group structure.  
This section will set out some of the perceived benefits that a group structure may provide in an 
attempt to highlight the advantages that businesses with group structures may have over corporations 
where multiple trades are conducted through a single entity.   
It is noted that the Margo Commission acknowledged the rationale for group formation in its report. 
Included in the Margo Commission report were concessions that separate entities could be required 
to satisfy trade regulations as well as to provide risk protection through the limited liability of 
companies22.   
 
2.4.1. BENEFITS OF GROUP STRUCTURES 
 
2.4.1.1. RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
 A benefit of key importance that may be derived from group structures is the ability to limit and 
manage risk. Trades can be separated into their own corporate entities which carry limited liability 
status23. This means, generally speaking, if a group entity conducting a trade finds itself in financial 
difficulty, creditors are only able to stake claims against that particular entity and its asset base. 
The assets and trades of the other group entities may remain unaffected, subject to legal expertise 
which goes beyond the scope of this dissertation24.  
                                                            
22Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa: 1987 (Margo 
Commission Report) Pages 199 to 200 
23 Mistarz, E, (2016) What are the advantages of a Holding Company – Legal Vision. Page 2 
24 There may be instances where gross negligence or fraudulent activity can be proven which have assets held 
by shareholders included in litigation. This could possibly include their shareholding in other group entities.  
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 Following on from the above, the separation of risk may increase the shareholders’ appetites for 
taking on new and riskier ventures with the peace of mind of knowing that the risk associated 
with the new venture is limited to the entity in which the trade is conducted25. This may result in 
increased return to shareholders which, if occurring on a large scale, has the possibility of 
contributing to the upturn of an economy26. Of course, it may also result in decreased returns 
where new ventures lead to losses.  
 
 The ability to manage risk within a business allows for its longevity as it allows the other trades to 
continue if a specific separate trade finds itself in financial difficulty.  
 
2.4.1.2. STRATEGIC  
 
 In practice, businesses often lure experts in the relevant industries into employment or incentivise 
existing employees by way of equity share offerings. Where multiple trades are carried out under 
one entity, shareholders may be reluctant to part with their shareholding thereby possibly 
foregoing the benefits of the relevant skills that may be available if such skilled people can be 
lured into employment. Under a group scenario, shareholders may be more willing to part with a 
minority shareholding in specific subsidiary companies while still being able to maintain control27.  
 
 Following on from the above, a similar principle may be applied where investment is required to 
further a certain trade. Shareholders are able to offer shares in the specific company that contains 
the trade requiring funding without having to forego ownership of their interests in the other 
trades.  
 
 Where trades are contained in separate entities, it provides flexibility where the parent may wish 
to dispose of a trade for whatever reason. Under a group structure, subsidiaries are easily 
disposed of without affecting the operations of the other group entities and trades28.  
 
2.4.2. DRAWBACKS OF GROUP STRUCTURE 
 
Some of the drawbacks of group structures are provided below:  
 Group structures bring with them the formal separation of trades into different entities. In 
terms of accounting and tax practices, intra‐group transactions then need to be recorded and 
relevant taxes may get triggered.  
 
 Further to this, the requirement to satisfy group accounting and tax practices brings with it 
added complexity to the administration of the business which include extra tax submissions29.  
                                                            
25 Mistarz, E, (2016) What are the advantages of a Holding Company – Legal Vision. Page 2 
26 While research into the effects on the economy is out of the scope of this dissertation, it follows logical 
process that increased returns achieved within businesses would contribute to an improvement in the 
economy.  
27 Rogan, H, (2018) ‐ Group structures – Weightmans. Page 7 
28 Ibid. Page 8 
29 Bragg, S, (2018) Corporation advantages and disadvantages – Accounting Tools – Page 1 
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 Current tax legislation does not allow for the loss sharing between group entities. This 
contrasts to the tax treatment of divisionalised entities where losses are shared amongst 
trades.  
 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
 
It is evident from the above findings that there are definite business advantages to the formation of 
group structures. As pointed out, smaller tightly‐held businesses, that cannot afford the associated 
compliance and administration costs are limited in their ability to set up a group structure, may be at 
a disadvantage to their larger counterparts. Further to this, the current tax treatment of groups has 
the effect of causing shareholders to favour a divisionalised single‐entity business.  
For the above reasons, businesses may be deprived of the business advantages that a group structure 
may offer them. Single‐entity businesses expose themselves to greater risk thereby potentially 
jeopardising the longevity of the business.  
Based on the advantages and disadvantages of groups discussed in this chapter, there may be a case 
for the view to provide a more favourable tax environment to groups than is currently the case. This 
is to encourage more businesses to enter into group structures so that they may draw from its 
benefits.   
For this reason, the group tax proposal in chapter 8 will aim to encourage group formation through 
the relief provided.   
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CHAPTER 3 
3. GROUP TAX 
 
3.1. WHAT IS GROUP TAX 
 
Group tax refers to a system whereby companies within a group are taxed on a more unified basis 
such that inter alia profits of one company in the group are allowed to be offset with losses of other 
companies within a group. This is different to the current method of taxing each entity on an 
independent basis where no facility is available to share losses between group members other than 
through creative tax planning30. There are various models in practice by which this may be achieved 
with varying independence levels of group members. The core objectives of group taxation are31: 
1. Tax‐neutral transfer of assets between companies within a group. This may be between 
parent and subsidiary as well as between subsidiaries.  
2. Setting‐off of profits against losses within a group to provide relief where entities within a 
group incur tax losses 
There are group tax models in practice that do not allow for both of the above objectives to be 
achieved, however, all classical forms of group tax allow for some sort of loss sharing between group 
entities. In the sections to follow, some of the more common group tax models which exist in practice 
will be identified and explained32.  
 
3.2. CALLS FOR GROUP TAX 
 
In the DTC report, the committee acknowledged calls for group tax to be implemented in South 
Africa33 based on the perceived benefits it may provide to the economy. These calls provide a rationale 
for why a full group tax system should be implemented in South Africa. Some of these arguments, as 
contained in the DTC report, are provided below:   
 Corporations often split their business activities into smaller companies for business reasons 
such as the management of risk through limited liability. The concern is that, while the 
business may have split itself into smaller entities, in reality, it still operates as a single entity 
and perhaps should be taxed as such34.  
 
The Margo Commission have taken this a step further to state that it may even be viewed as 
unfair for entities in a group to be taxed while the overall position of the group may be in a 
loss position35. This is because of the view that a group, with all its entities, operates in much 
the same way a divisionalised single‐entity business.  
                                                            
30 Margo Commission Report: Page 202 
31 DTC Report: Page 67 
32 Ibid. Page 67 
33 Ibid. Page 76 
34 Ibid. Page 76 
35 Ibid. Page 202 
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 A country’s attractiveness as an investment destination is contributed to by the attractiveness 
of its tax legislation36. Countries from which South Africa are looking to attract investment are 
generally from the more developed regions. These regions, in most cases, already have group 
tax systems in place. From an investor’s perspective, it could appear risky for them to get 
involved with tax systems that they aren’t familiar with or have less favourable terms than 
those which they are accustomed to. From this point one can deduce that a group tax system 
may improve the attractiveness for foreign investment.  
 
 In terms of administration, there would be initial issues with the implementation of a group 
tax system, however, in the long‐run there may be administration relief for SARS. Instead of 
collecting tax from every entity, they may only need to assess the liability of the unit as one 
entity, depending on the model of group tax implemented37.  
 
 As pointed out by the Margo report, similar results to that of profit and loss shifting within a 
group can be derived through creative tax planning38. While this may be prohibited and 
lessened by anti‐avoidance rules, there are likely many corporations that are able to structure 
their affairs in a tax neutral manner. This sort of planning is expensive and would likely only 
be done by the larger corporations thereby granting them an advantage over their smaller 
competitors. Group tax would diminish the necessity for this sort of tax planning and allow for 
increased business focus.  
 
 Prior to the formal findings of the Nugent Commission, which will be discussed in further detail 
in chapter 9 of this dissertation, there was an acknowledgement of the strides taken by SARS 
in the last decade to become one of the more efficient organs of government. Concerns set 
out in the Margo report relating to the ability of SARS to cope with group taxation were argued 
to no longer have been prevalent39. The Davis committee however, is of the view that 
although SARS has improved over the last decade, due to more recent problems (see chapter 
8) it still has some way to go before it will be able to handle a transition over to group 
taxation40.   
 
 A point alluded to in chapter 1, included in the rationale for why a group tax system should be 
implemented is the opinion that tax policy should not only be determined with the aim of 
maximising revenue collection for the fiscus. It should be designed to support economic 
growth41. 
 
 Groups may be prejudiced over divisionalised single‐entity businesses in that profit‐making 
entities may be liable for tax while the overall position of the group could be in a tax loss 
position. The additional cash outflow may jeopardize the long‐term future of the group which 
                                                            
36 Ibid. Page 76 
37 Ibid. Page 76 
38 Margo Commission Report: Page 202 
39 DTC Report: Page 78 
40 Ibid. Page 78 
41 Ibid. Page 77 
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may result in a reduction of the fiscus’ tax base in the future42. A group tax system would allow 
for the offsetting of profits with losses between trades while being able to maintain a group 
structure and the benefits thereof.  
 
3.3. BENEFITS OF GROUP TAX 
 
It may be viewed as unfair for entities in a group to be taxed while the overall position of the group 
may be in a loss position43. This is because of the view that a group, with all its entities, operates in 
much the same way as a divisionalised single‐entity business.  
 
Below is a summary of some of the more pertinent benefits that a group tax regime may provide that 
have not already been covered in 3.2 above:  
 Businesses are able to organise themselves in a manner that provides the most efficiency in 
terms of their business operations44.  This may result in the streamlining of group structures 
as entities previously established to simulate group tax advantages would no longer be 
required45.  
 
 The system may provide flexibility in terms of asset transfer between entities within a group. 
Group tax generally, depending on the selected model of implementation, allows for the tax 
neutral transfer of assets between group members46. All members are seen as one and the 
same person with regard to the asset. As a consequence, any such gains on asset transfer will 
only be recognised when the asset is transferred to third parties outside of the group.  
  
 Overall efficiency of the country’s tax system may be improved as larger units are being taxed 
instead of its components being taxed individually. This may provide efficiency for the 
taxpaying entities as well as the revenue collection mechanism47. Admittedly, SARS will need 
to ensure that all entities are correctly disclosed, however a reduction in compliance related 
requirements may be applicable depending on the model of implementation.   
 
 From an investment perspective, businesses would be more open to investing in and 
expanding a business through additional subsidiaries if they have a safety net of being able to 
set off other profits with losses of new entities should they arise48. This safety net can be 
achieved while maintaining the non‐tax benefits associated with a group structure.  While 
close monitoring of continuously loss‐making entities should be applied, it generally is the 
case that start‐ups usually find themselves in loss positions before they start turning profits. 
 
                                                            
42 Ibid. Page 77 
43 Ibid. Page 202 
44 Ibid. Page 66 
45 Third Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa, 
1995 (Katz Commission Report (3)). Page 97  
46 DTC Report: Page 66 
47 Ibid. Page 66 
48 Margo Commission Report: Page 201 
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 A movement towards a group tax system would signify a movement in conformance with 
international practices49.  
 
3.4. DRAWBACKS OF GROUP TAX 
 
Below is a summary of some of the drawbacks associated with group tax: 
 Group taxation provides tax relief to corporate groups of companies. The potential relief on 
offer comes at the expense of the fiscus50. There is a concern, that with South Africa’s need to 
maximise revenue collection to meet its budgetary requirements, the country will not be able 
to sustain itself given the perceived likelihood of a drop in revenue collection that a group tax 
system would bring with it.   
 
 A group tax system in South Africa may result in added complexity to an already complex tax 
system51. Questions have been raised as to whether a group tax system and its complexities 
can be capably managed by SARS and taxpayers. In this regard, there would be a need for skill 
levels to be aligned with the complexities of implementing a group tax system52.  
 
 Group tax may be administratively burdensome for taxpayers53 due to its unfamiliarity and 
would require skills training before a level of efficiency may be achieved.    
 
 Group tax may create uncertainty for revenue collection and planning as it is generally not 
known upfront how entities within a group will act. This occurs in cases where entities within 
a group are able to elect whether they would be participating in a group tax system and where 
there are different permutations on loss transfer options available54. This depends on the 
model of implementation.  
 
 The provision for profit and loss offsetting may encourage the trafficking of loss incurring 
companies to abuse the system.  This, together with the other relief mechanisms offered by 
group tax, means that added anti‐avoidance provisions will be required to ensure that relief 
provisions are only used for the purposes for which they are intended by legislators55.  
 
3.5. GROUP TAX MODELS 
 
As discussed above, there are core group tax objectives, as provided by the DTC report. Countries 
make use of various group tax models to achieve a set of goals specific to their fiscal policies.  The 
most prevalent of these Models are identified and their basic features described below as provided 
by the DTC report.  
                                                            
49 Ibid. Page 201 
50 Katz Commission Report(3): Page 98 
51 Ibid. Page 98 
52 DTC Report Page 78 
53 Ibid. Page 83 
54 Margo Commission Report: Page 200 
55 Ibid. Page 201 
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3.5.1. ORGANSCHAFT MODEL 
 
This model may be found in Austria and Germany. It has the effect of allowing profits and losses of 
the subsidiaries to be consolidated at the parent level. As the name suggests, the subsidiaries are 
treated as organs of the parent that, together, form a single body.  
Profit earning entities within the group are required to transfer their profits up to the parent which, 
in turn, will redistribute them to its subsidiaries in the most tax efficient manner or how it sees fit. 
Profits are thereby reduced in profit‐making entities as this profit would get transferred to loss making 
entities which, in turn, reduces their losses.   
In practice there is generally a provision which disallows an entity that was a profit earning entity to 
show a loss after the profits have been redistributed. Thus, the transfer of profit would be limited to 
the neutrality of member entities.  
The relief, however, does not make provision for the deferral of gains and losses incurred on the 
transfer of assets between entities within the group.  
Each entity would then still be required to submit its own tax returns56.  
 
3.5.2. GROUP CONTRIBUTION MODEL 
 
This model is practiced mainly in the Nordic region where countries such as Norway, Finland and 
Sweden have introduced it. It is based on the shifting of profits from one entity to another within the 
same group. This may be between the parent and its members as well as amongst member entities 
themselves.  
The entity transferring its profits will be granted a deduction for the amount transferred while the 
entities receiving the profits will recognise a taxable income. Again, in practice, the transfer of profits 
is only allowed such that the transferor does not enter itself into a loss‐making position.  
Each entity will be required to submit its own tax return and would be responsible for its own tax 
affairs after taking into account the profit shifting relief discussed above57. 
The contribution model differs from the Organschaft model in that it allows the direct transfer of profit 
between all qualifying and participating group members whereas in an Organschaft, all incomes are 
first transferred to the parent and thereafter distributed to its entities.  
 
3.5.3. GROUP RELIEF MODEL 
 
As will be seen through the later chapters in this dissertation, this mechanism has been favoured by 
the various research findings that have been conducted regarding group tax in South Africa. It is 
currently practiced in the UK and Netherlands.  
                                                            
56 DTC Report: Page 67 
57 Ibid. Page 68 
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In this model, losses, as opposed to profits per the models discussed above, are transferred between 
entities in a group. This may be done between the parent and its subsidiaries or between the 
subsidiaries themselves. There is a limitation that limits losses being received to achieve neutrality. 
Group members would be responsible to see to their own tax affairs after taking the loss transfers 
into account58.  
 
3.5.4. CONSOLIDATION MODEL 
 
In this model, all entities within the group lose their individual identities for tax purposes and jointly 
take the identity of the parent. This model is implemented in developed countries such as Australia 
and the USA as well as in developing countries such as Taiwan and South Korea59. It is the most 
commonly used model globally.  
All members within the group calculate their incomes at member level which thereafter gets 
consolidated at parent level after making necessary adjustments. Intra‐group transactions are 
disregarded for tax purposes.  
The result of the consolidation model is that the parent is required to see to the tax affairs of the group 
in that it is required to submit a tax return on behalf of itself and its participating members. This would 
provide for the desired effect of reducing the compliance requirements for groups thereby allowing 
smaller businesses form groups and derive its benefits.  
 
3.5.5. SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE GROUP TAX MODELS 
 
As noted above there are various models by which group tax may be implemented. It cannot be said, 
in general, that one model is superior to another. The model of implementation needs to be assessed 
in line with the objectives of the relevant legislative bodies as well as its cohesion with existing tax 
laws.  
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
 
It is evident, based on the perceived benefits and the rationale for calls to group tax that a group tax 
system would provide for a more favourable environment in which to conduct business. Notable 
evidence for this is the ability to offset profits and losses between group entities while being able to 
maintain group structures and their benefits. As a result, businesses will be able to focus more on their 
core business activities instead of utilizing their resources to simulate the effects of profit and loss 
offsetting.   
Further to this, the ability to offset profits with losses within group structures provides for more 
shareholder confidence when deciding to enter into a new business venture. The comfort of being 
able to maintain the limited liability of the new venture will increase the likelihood of the business 
                                                            
58 Ibid. Page 68 
59 DLA Piper (2018), Guide to going Global Tax. Pages 154 and 175 
18 
 
taking it on. As noted, group tax could result in the reduction of compliance requirements for groups 
where the consolidation model is implemented. These key benefits of group tax, as provided by this 
chapter, may lead to the growth and development of businesses that participate in it.   
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CHAPTER 4 
4. CORPORATE RULES 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Subsequent to the release of the Margo and Katz Commission reports, legislators introduced the 
corporate rules as a form of relief offered to companies. Currently, the corporate rules are the closest 
legislation that South Africa has that could be ascribed to a group tax system.  
As stated in chapter 3, the core objectives of group tax are to allow entities within a group to tax 
neutrally transfer assets amongst members as well as allowing them to share their assessed losses.   
This chapter aims to provide a brief analysis of the current corporate relief mechanisms available in 
South Africa and to assess whether there are elements of group tax that exist within them.   
 
4.2. THE CORPORATE RULES 
 
The set of corporate rules that are found in Sections 41 – 47 of the Tax Act provide tax relief to 
companies which are primarily aimed at providing tax relief on transfer of assets between corporate 
entities in certain pre‐defined circumstances.  
For the relevant reliefs to apply, the parties involved are required to meet certain criteria which are 
to be discussed as the chapter progresses. Special focus will, however, be placed on the income tax 
aspects.  
The below sub‐sections of this chapter will provide a brief summary of the nature of the transactions 
to which the reliefs apply and the specific reliefs provided by each of the sections contained in the 
corporate rules. Further detail may be found in the Tax Act under the relevant sections.  
 
4.2.1. SECTION 41 
 
Section 41 is a general provision that provides the definitions and clarity of terms used in sections 42 
to 47. The terms defined in these sections are limited to use within the corporate rules provisions and 
override the definitions found elsewhere in the Act where applicable.  
In general, the tax treatment as per the corporate rules supersedes the treatments as stipulated 
elsewhere in the Act60. Included in the exceptions to this include the general anti‐avoidance rules in 
                                                            
60 Section 41(2) of the Tax Act 
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respect of assessed losses61, the anti‐avoidance provisions62 and instances where shares are issued in 
return for assets with different value to the shares63.  
 
4.2.2. SECTION 42 – ASSET FOR SHARE TRANSACTION 
 
4.2.2.1. APPLICATION 
 
Section 42 deals with asset for share transactions. As the title suggests, the section provides roll‐over 
relief for companies that wish to acquire assets from anyone in exchange for equity shares in its 
company64.  Companies are not required to be part of the same group of companies in order to 
participate in this provision65.  
In general, if the requirements of section 4266 are met, the provision allows rollover relief to be applied 
where assets are acquired by a company in exchange for its equity shares.  
The result of the above transaction is that the acquiring company effectively steps into the shoes of 
the transferor with regard to the asset, thereby rolling over the tax consequences until such time that 
the asset is disposed of to an outside third party. The acquiring company will be one in the same as 
the transferor with regard to: 
 The cost, 
 the time of acquisition; and  
 valuation done by the transferor in terms of the eighth schedule67 (where applicable).  
 
4.2.2.2. ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 
 
Legislation has provided for anti‐avoidance rules to limit the abuse of the relief within an 18‐month 
period from the date of the transaction. 
In terms of the transferor company, anti‐avoidance rules68 are triggered if the company ceases to hold 
a qualifying interest69 in the transferee company within 18 months of the asset for share transaction.  
In general, the transferor company is deemed to have sold, at market value, all its shares it acquired 
in terms of the asset for share transaction. This may give rise to capital gains tax that had been 
deferred in terms of the asset for share transaction70. 
                                                            
61 Section 103(2) of the Tax Act 
62 Sections 80A to 80L of the Tax Act 
63 Section 24BA of the Tax Act 
64 Section 42(1) of the Tax Act 
65 Section 42(2)(a) of the Tax Act 
66 Section 42(2)(a) of the Tax Act 
67 Section 42(2)(b)(aa) of the Tax Act 
68 Section 42(6)(a) of the Tax Act 
69 Section 42 (a) of the Tax Act 
70 Section 42(6)(a) of the Tax Act 
21 
 
In terms of the transferee company, anti‐avoidance rules are triggered if the company disposes of the 
asset acquired in terms of the asset for share transaction within an 18‐month period of the 
transaction.  The result is that, generally, a “portion” of the resulting profit on disposal may not be 
offset against any accumulated losses available to the company71.   
The “portion” referred to above is calculated as the market value of the asset on date of Asset for 
share transfer, less the deemed cost of the transfer72.  
 
4.2.2.3. GROUP TAX ELEMENTS 
 
Section 42 allows for tax roll‐over relief where assets are transferred from any person (including 
companies) to a resident company73 74. The relief is much the same as would be afforded to companies 
within a group participating in a consolidation system of group tax.  
Whilst, the tax neutral transfer of assets between group members is an element of group tax relief, it 
is noted that there is no group requirement in order for relief to be derived under section 42. The 
author, however, acknowledges that while it may not be a requirement, groups may participate in the 
provision and benefit from the relief in much the same way since, in meeting the group requirements, 
entities would also meet the qualifying interest requirement of Section 42.  
Although the provision does allow for the tax neutral transfer of assets between corporate entities, it 
does so in instances that are not generally covered by group tax. Traditional group tax systems do not 
necessarily include relief in instances where assets are transferred in exchange for shares.  
Thus, while the section contains relief mechanisms that provide for tax neutrality when assets are 
transferred, it does not contain the elements that are contained within a traditional group tax system. 
 
4.2.3. SECTION 44 – AMALGAMATION TRANSACTIONS 
 
4.2.3.1. APPLICATION 
 
Section 44 deals with Amalgamation transactions. An amalgamation transaction is defined as a 
transaction whereby a resident company (amalgamated company) transfers all of its assets to another 
resident company (resultant company) in exchange for equity shares in that resultant company. The 
result of which needs to lead to the termination of the amalgamated company within 36 months of 
the transaction75.  
Companies are not required to be part of the same group of companies in order to participate in this 
provision.  
                                                            
71 Section 42(7) of the Tax Act 
72 Haupt, P (2015) Notes on South Africa Income Tax – Page 555 
73 Section 42(a)(i) of the Tax Act 
74 Section 42(b) allows for the provisions of the section to apply to foreign companies; however, this is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, thus details of which has been omitted.  
75 Section 44(1) of the Tax Act 
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If the requirements for the section are met, the consequences for the amalgamated and resultant 
companies will be the same as that of the rollover relief provided under section 42 above76.  
Shareholders are deemed to have disposed of shares in the amalgamated company at base cost and 
acquired the shares in resultant at that same cost77. The shares in the resultant company, held by the 
amalgamated company, are transferred to the shareholders of the amalgamated company’s 
shareholders without triggering dividends tax78.     
The above results in the tax neutral transfer of assets between the two companies where an 
amalgamation transaction has taken place. The effects are that the tax consequences of the asset 
transfer will be rolled over until such time that the assets are disposed of to an outside third party.  
 
4.2.3.2. ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 
 
The resultant company will trigger anti‐avoidance provisions if it disposes of an asset transferred in 
terms of the amalgamation transaction within 18 months of the transaction79. As was the case with 
section 42, the result, generally, is that a portion of the capital on the disposal of capital assets may 
not be set off against any other capital loss available to the company. In the case where trading stock 
is disposed of, a portion of the profits on sale may be deemed to be from a separate trade and cannot 
be set off against other assessed losses80.  
As was the case with the asset for share transaction, the portion referred to above is equal to the 
market value of the asset on the date of transfer, less the deemed cost at which it had been transferred 
in terms of the amalgamation transaction.   
 
4.2.3.3. GROUP TAX ELEMENTS 
 
There are elements of group tax present in the section 44 amalgamation provision. Assets are allowed 
to be transferred tax neutrally between two companies subject to the anti‐avoidance provisions.  
While the author acknowledges that there are no group requirements for this transaction to be 
applied, is it submitted that these benefits may nevertheless still be derived by a group of companies 
where an amalgamation transaction is to take place.   
 
 
 
 
                                                            
76 Sections 44(2)(a), 44(2)(b) and 44(3)(a) of the Tax Act 
77 Section 44(8) of the Tax Act 
78 Section 44(6) of the Tax Act 
79 Section 44(5) of the Tax Act 
80 Section 44(5) of the Tax Act 
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4.2.4. SECTION 45 – INTRA‐GROUP TRANSACTIONS 
 
4.2.4.1. APPLICATION 
 
An intra‐group transaction is defined as the disposal of an asset by one company to another resident81 
company within the same group of companies82. The term group is defined in terms of Section 41 of 
the Act83.  
If the requirements84 of the section are met, the transferor is deemed to have disposed of assets tax 
neutrally to the transferee company thereby not triggering any tax consequences for both parties85.  
The result of the above is that, with regard to the asset being transferred, the transferee steps into 
the shoes of the transferor as if it had held the asset from initial purchase into the group. This results 
in the tax neutral transfer of assets between entities within the same group of companies86. The relief 
provided by section 45 is automatic unless elected out by the transferor and transferee companies87.  
 
4.2.4.2. ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 
 
There are two instances of relevance to this dissertation88 where anti‐avoidance provisions may get 
triggered in terms of an intra‐company transaction. These two instances are de‐grouping and the 
disposal of the asset transferred in terms of the intra‐company transaction.  
De-grouping 
De‐grouping occurs when the entities in question cease to meet the requirements of a group in terms 
of Section 41 of the Act. The Act states that if either of the entities de‐group within a 6‐year period of 
the transaction, the transferee company is deemed to have disposed of the section 45 assets which 
are still on hand89. The result is that the transferee company will trigger tax consequences similar to 
that in the previous sections90.  
18-month rule 
If an asset is disposed of by the transferee company within 18 months, then the effects will be similar 
to that of those described in section 42 asset for share transactions91.  
                                                            
81 Section 45(1)(b) contains instances where section 45 may apply to foreign companies. This, however, is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, thus, discussion of which has been omitted.  
82 Section 45(1)(a) of the Tax Act 
83 Section 45(1)(a) of the Tax Act 
84 Haupt, P (2015) Notes on South African Income Tax, Page 568 
85 Section 45(2) and (3) of the Tax Act 
86 Section 41 of the Tax Act 
87 Section 45(6) of the Tax Act 
88 Section 45(3A) of the Tax Act contains anti‐avoidance provisions where the asset is funded by debt. A 
discussion of this is beyond the scope of this dissertation and has thus been omitted.  
89 Section 45(4) of the Tax Act 
90 Sections 45(4)(b)(i), 45(4)(b)(ii) and 45(4)(b)(iii) of the Tax Act 
91 Section 45(5) of the Tax Act 
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In general, where the transferee company has disposed of an asset acquired in terms of a section 45 
transaction, a portion of the gains, profit or recoupment may not be set off against other capital losses 
or accumulated losses of the company. The disallowed portion is the market value on date of section 
45 transaction, less the base cost at which it was transferred92.  
 
4.2.4.3. GROUP TAX ELEMENTS 
 
Section 45, which deals with intra‐company transactions, contains the closest link to group tax that is 
currently present in tax legislation in that the presence of a group is required. The section allows for 
the tax neutral transfer of assets between companies within a group where rollover provisions defer 
the triggering of tax until such time that the assets are disposed of out of the group.  
With section 45, there is a group requirement which ties it more closely to a group taxation system 
than the previous corporate rules discussed. The tax neutrality achieved in section 45 is similar to the 
rollover relief provided though a consolidation model of group taxation where intra‐group 
transactions are disregarded for tax purposes.    
 
4.2.5. SECTION 46 – UNBUNDLING TRANSACTIONS 
 
4.2.5.1. APPLICATION 
 
An unbundling transaction is defined as any transaction in terms of which a company (unbundling 
company) transfers its full equity shareholding in an unbundled company to its shareholders93.  
The aim of this is to enable the shareholders of the unbundling company to directly hold the shares of 
the unbundled company.  
In terms of the scope of this dissertation, the focus will be concentrated on resident companies while 
also disregarding the unbundling transactions that are necessary in terms of an order from the 
competition tribunal.    
In this regard, there are 2 types of companies to which this provision may apply. 
1. Resident listed companies 
2. Resident unlisted companies 
Unlisted companies are required to be part of the same group of companies to participate in the 
provision.  
If the requirements94 of section 46 are met, then the shares transferred to the shareholders of the 
unbundling company will be deemed to have been transferred at the same date and cost at which the 
unbundling company acquired them95.  
                                                            
92 Haupt, P (2015) Notes on South African Income Tax, Page 572 
93 Section 46(1) of the Tax Act 
94 Haupt, P (2015) Notes on South African Income Tax, Page 575 
95 Section 46(2) of the Tax Act 
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The result of this is that no capital gains are realised as a result of the transaction if the market value 
on the date of transfers exceeds the cost on acquisition.  Further to this, the dividend in specie which 
is used to transfer shares from the unbundling company to its shareholders is disregarded for the 
purposes of dividends tax96.  
 
4.2.5.2. ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 
 
There are no anti‐avoidance provisions for an unbundling transaction in terms of section 46, the 
requirements are however limiting.  
 
4.2.5.3. GROUP TAX ELEMENTS 
 
Section 46 unbundling transactions allow for the tax neutral transfer of shares in the unbundled 
company, held by the unbundling company to its shareholders.  
For unlisted companies, the shareholding company of the unbundling company and the unbundling 
company are required to be part of the same group of companies. Therefore, under section 46, shares 
are allowed to transferred tax neutrally between members of a group.  
The group requirement is relaxed for listed companies where a 35% or 25%97 equity shareholding is 
required. The author, however, submits that groups may equally derive the benefit thereof.  
There are therefore group tax elements present in section 46 as assets (shares) are able to be 
transferred tax neutrally between companies where the applicable shareholding criteria is met.  
 
4.2.6. SECTION 47 – LIQUIDATION DISTRIBUTION 
 
4.2.6.1. APPLICATION 
 
A liquidation distribution transaction is defined as any transaction in terms of which a resident 
liquidating company distributes all of its assets to its shareholders in anticipation of or in the course 
of the liquidation, winding‐up or deregistration of the liquidating company. The liquidating company 
may however, retain assets required to settle any debts that is had incurred in its normal course of 
trade98.  
Unlisted companies are required to be part of the same group of companies to participate in the 
provision.  
                                                            
96 Section 46(5) of the Tax Act 
97 25% would be sufficient only if there are no other shareholders that own more shares in the unbundled 
company.  
98 Section 47(1) of the Tax Act 
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If the requirements99 of the section are met, similarly to the previous provisions, the shareholding 
company is deemed to be one and the same person as the liquidating company with regard to the 
assets transferred and is said to have stepped into the shoes of the liquidating company and thus 
rollover relief will be applicable to the shareholding company with regard to the assets transferred100.  
 
4.2.6.2. ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 
 
Anti‐avoidance provisions may get triggered in terms of a liquidation transaction where an asset 
acquired in terms of a liquidation distribution is disposed of within 18 months of the transaction101. 
Tax is triggered in much the same way as that of the Section 45 intracompany transactions 18‐month 
anti‐avoidance rules. A portion of the gains, profit or recoupment may not be set off against other 
capital losses or accumulated losses of the company. Where the disallowed portion is the market value 
on date of section 45 transaction, less the base cost at which it was transferred 
 
4.2.6.3. GROUP TAX ELEMENTS 
 
Section 47 liquidation distribution allows for the tax neutral transfer of assets from the liquidating 
company to its shareholding company in cases where they form part of the same group of companies. 
Similar to section 45, the intra‐group transaction provision, the roll‐over relief derived from the 
transfer of assets between companies within a group represents elements of group taxation.  
 
4.3. CONCLUSION 
 
From the above analysis of the corporate rules, it is evident that there are some elements of group 
tax that exist within the corporate rules. This is found predominantly with regard to the tax neutral 
transfer of assets from one corporate entity to another. This is consistent with the results that could 
be obtained where a group participates in a group tax system with a notable exception being an 
organschaft group tax system.  
For sections 45, 46 and 47 there are requirements for companies to be part of the same group in order 
for the reliefs of the provisions to be applicable. For sections 42 and 44, these requirements are 
relaxed.   
As stated in chapter 3, one of the main objectives of a group taxation system is to allow for the tax 
neutral transfer of assets between entities within a group102.  
From this chapter’s investigation, it would seem that the current South African corporate tax 
legislation does indeed allow for roll‐over relief when assets are transferred between entities in a 
group and therefore contain one of the objectives of group taxation.  
                                                            
99 Haupt, P (2015) Notes on South African Income Tax, Page 579 to 580 
100 Sections 47(2)(a)(i), 47(2)(a)(ii), 47(2)(b)(ii) and 47(3)(b)(ii) of the Tax Act 
101 Section 47(4)(a) of the Tax Act 
102 DTC Report: Page 67 
27 
 
There is, however, currently no provision in the corporate rules, nor in the rest of the Act which allow 
for profits and losses to offset each other in determining group taxable income. The anti‐avoidance 
rules contained within the corporate rules, together with the anti‐avoidance rules that prohibit the 
use of assessed losses in certain instances actively prohibit the sharing of losses between entities 
through intra‐company transactions.  
It is further noted that the anti‐avoidance provisions contained in these rules greatly limit the flexibility 
to manoeuvre assets between group entities which would not have been the case under a traditional 
group tax system.  
On this basis, the author submits that while there are elements of group taxation in the corporate 
rules provision, there does not exist a group tax system in the complete sense. It is thus submitted 
that the current provisions contained within the corporate rules are insufficient to meet the objectives 
of a group tax system.   
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CHAPTER 5 
  
5. COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the years there have been various Commissions of Inquiry set up in order that they may provide 
an analysis of the tax system of its time. The Commissions are generally set up by the Finance minister 
at the time to provide guidance and recommendations as to policy changes and additions that may 
enhance the efficiency of the tax system and the country as a whole.  
Of particular relevance for the purpose of this dissertation, are the: 
‐ Margo Commission of Inquiry (Published 1987), 
‐ Katz Commission of Inquiry (Published 1995) and 
‐ Davis Tax Committee103(Published 2018). 
These Commissions all contained an analysis of group taxation as part of their recommendation 
reports. Bear in mind that all three were released at different times and therefore had differing 
economic, political and social contexts.  
While there are some commonalities contained within the reports, there are differing views, possibly 
as a result of the different environment within which they were produced. A further breakdown and 
analysis of these reports are provided below. 
Parts of these reports have already been discussed earlier in this dissertation, with particular reference 
to the benefits and drawbacks of group tax identified in chapter 3. The findings and recommendations 
of the above reports, based on their respective arguments contained in chapter 3, will be provided 
below.  
The recommendations contained in the reports will be used to draft a group tax proposal for South 
Africa in chapter 9 and ultimately assist in concluding on the research question posed in chapter 1.   
 
5.2. MARGO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
 
5.2.1. BACKGROUND 
 
The Margo Commission of Inquiry (the Commission104) was formed on 20 November 1984 on the 
proclamation of Former President P.W Botha and on the order of then Finance Minister BJ Du 
Plessis105. The Commission was set up with the objective of reforming the tax system in South Africa. 
                                                            
103 The DTC differed from the other bodies in that it was a committee and not a commission. The DTC mandate 
was similar to that of its predecessors, however, being a committee, it did not have the right of subpoena 
which limited its work.  
104 This short‐hand is limited for use in subchapter 5.2 when referring to the Margo Commission.  
105 Margo Commission Report: Page 8 
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Included in the recommendations provided by the report was the Commissions view on group tax in 
South Africa.  
The Commission’s report was publicly released in 1987, titled Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa.  By a majority vote of its members, the 
Commission believed that a group taxation system in South African would not be appropriate106.  
The Commission had taken a comprehensive approach in deciding whether or not group taxation 
should be implemented. This chapter will analyse the group tax part of the report and look into the 
reasons as to why the Commission had been opposed to South Africa instating a group taxation system 
when so many of the world’s developed countries were already long enjoying its fruits.  
In arriving at its final recommendation, the Commission provided a discussion on which group tax 
model would be best suited to South Africa. Thereafter, the Commission formulated arguments for 
and against group tax which ultimately led to their final vote and conclusive recommendation.   
 
5.2.2. ELECTION OF GROUP TAX MODEL 
 
The majority of the submissions received by the Commission in its investigation into group tax 
favoured the group relief model. The group relief model was perceived to be simpler, however this 
was noted as a questionable belief by the Commission. In fact, the Commission expressed concern 
over the complexity of the model and the uncertainty it may bring. It was asserted that, due to the 
long timespan provided to entities to decide on the many possibilities to transfer losses within the 
group, it may result in difficulty for the planning and forecasting for both the entities, as well as the 
Revenue service107.  
Members of the Commission had expressed favour of the consolidation model due to their perceived 
view that it would be a simpler model to implement. The exercise of consolidation occurs in a relatively 
short period and the method of consolidation provides certainty as to how the profits and losses will 
be combined at a group level108. This reduces the uncertainty associated with the group relief model 
discussed above. Members were also of the view the consolidation approach is a sounder method of 
group tax.  
The Commission seemed to be of the view that a consolidated system with a strong set of anti‐
avoidance rules would be the best option for South Africa should a group tax system be 
implemented109.   
 
5.2.3. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT 
 
As stated upfront, the members of the Commission voted against the implementation of group 
taxation110 as they were of the view that the perceived drawbacks of the system were not endurable 
                                                            
106 Ibid. Page 202 
107 Margo Commission report: Page 200 
108 Ibid. Page 201 
109 Omar, S, (2009), Group Taxation in South Africa – A contextual analysis: Page 25 
110 Ibid. Page 202 
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for the country at the time – given the climate in which this report was released as well as the level of 
development prevalent in South Africa.   
There were, however, some important points of value noted by the minority group who were in favour 
of recommending a group tax system in South Africa. They suggested that a group tax system should 
be introduced subject to the following accompanying provisions: 
 Anti‐avoidance measures should be put in place to limit the trafficking of assessed losses; 
 Group tax relief should not apply to losses incurred prior to a subsidiary joining the group; 
 There should be requirements that only allow for wholly owned subsidiaries to participate in 
the group tax system111.  
 
5.2.4. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 
The Margo Commission had voted against recommending the instatement of a group tax system in 
South Africa for concerns mainly relating to the prevailing state of the economy and capabilities of 
SARS at the time to deal with the perceived complexities of group tax. The members seemed to be of 
the view that, should a group tax system be implemented it should be via the consolidation model for 
reasons including the perceived complexity of a group relief system and the uncertainty it provided to 
the fiscus. Further to this, the discerning portion of the Commission provided valuable rules to 
accompany a group tax system to limit its perceived drawbacks.  
 
5.3. THE KATZ COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
 
5.3.1. BACKGROUND 
 
The Katz Commission report was issued in 1995 at the request of then Finance Minister, Trevor 
Manual.  The differing periods in which the work was performed meant contrasting economic, political 
and social climates in South Africa as compared to the Margo Commission report. South Africa had 
just been liberated from the oppressive Apartheid regime and had been energized by the new‐found 
democracy.  
The Katz Commission had of course recognised the change in climate and as a result had concluded 
on a positive recommendation to instate group taxation in South Africa112. It was of the view that 
South Africa had been lagging behind in terms of corporate tax treatment of groups and could not 
afford to fall behind any further113.  
 
5.3.2. ELECTION OF GROUP TAX MODEL 
 
                                                            
111 Ibid. Page 202 
112 First Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 
(Katz Commission Report (1)): Pages 7 to 8 
113 Katz Commission Report (3), Page 96 
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The Katz Commission (the Commission114) eventually also favoured the consolidation model for group 
tax as opposed to the group relief model115. The reasons it provided for this are summarised below: 
 The Group relief model does not recognise that, although a group may consist of different 
entities, they operate very much as a unit116.  
 Group relief provides an environment which encourages manipulation of intra‐group 
transactions looking to derive undue tax advantages for the group117.  
 The consolidation model has the advantage of allowing the group to submit a single 
submission to SARS that contains financial information of the entire participating group. 
This allows for an easier audit trail118.  
 Group relief was perceived to be a more complex system to maintain when considering 
the uncertainties of timing and optional loss transfers119.  
As a result of the above, the Katz Commission thus felt that should a group tax system be implemented 
in South Africa, it should be implemented via the consolidation method.  
 
5.3.3. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT 
 
As stated earlier, the Commission was of the view that South Africa had already lagged behind other 
countries in terms of corporate taxation120. As a result of this view, it recommended that group tax be 
implemented amid concerns of its drawbacks.  
The Commission had recommended that the consolidation model be utilized to implement group tax 
in South Africa citing the various reasons as stated above.   
Bearing the drawbacks in mind as well as the perceived fragility of the political, economic and social 
climates, the Commission recommended a gradual approach of implementation. The effects of a 
gradual approach translated into the following rules being recommended as part of a group tax 
introduction121. 
 Only wholly owned subsidiaries should qualify to be included in a group taxation system, with 
an exception for employees to own up 10% of the subsidiaries’ equity122.  
 Election should take place for the entire group. This means that all qualifying subsidiaries 
would be forced to follow the election of the parent. New group companies would qualify 
from the first full year that they are part of the group123.   
 
 Any accumulated losses accrued prior to the commencement or election of group taxation for 
the group should be ring‐fenced as not being allowed to set off against current or future 
                                                            
114 This short‐hand limited for use in subchapter 5.3 when referring to the Katz Commission 
115 Katz Commission Report: Page 98 
116 Ibid. Page 98 
117 Ibid. Page 98 
118 Ibid. Page 99 
119 Ibid. Page 99 
120 Omar, S (2009) – Group Taxation in South Africa – A contextual analysis: Page 29 
121 Katz Commission Report (3): Page 107 
122 Ibid. Page 107 
123 Ibid. Page 107 
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profits of the group. These losses may only be offset against that specific company’s future 
profits124.  
 
 Each company’s individual returns to be based on normal tax rules and adjustments made 
thereafter for intra‐company transactions (the Katz report had preceded but contributed to 
the decision to incorporate the corporate rules into legislation). Thereafter profits and losses 
should get contributed up to the parent in preparation of a consolidated return125.  
 
5.3.4. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 
The Katz Commission was resolute in its examination of South Africa’s corporate tax treatment in 
comparison with the international community. As a result of this, it believed that South Africa should 
be looking to implement a group tax system. It acknowledged the drawbacks in the wake of prevailing 
climates within the country at the time, leading to a gradual implementation recommendation. 
 
5.4. THE DAVIS TAX COMMITTEE 
 
5.4.1. BACKGROUND 
 
In July 2013, then Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, appointed the members of the Tax Review 
Committee. This name later changed to the Davis Tax Committee. Included in its mandate was to 
assess South Africa’s tax policy framework and its role in supporting objectives of inclusive growth, 
employment, development and fiscal sustainability126.   
In terms of the above mandated appointment, the DTC released a report in March 2018 titled, “Review 
of South Africa’s Corporate System”. The report provides an analysis of the current corporate tax 
structure prevalent in South Africa and recommendations thereon. Of particular interest to this 
dissertation is chapter 9 which focuses on group taxation.  
As an introduction to the investigation, the DTC posed the question of whether the introduction of 
group company taxation would enhance the efficiency of South Africa’s tax structure127. The format in 
which the report goes about answering this question is to firstly highlight and acknowledge the 
benefits that group taxation could offer and to determine a suitable mechanism whereby to achieve 
this in South Africa. Thereafter, as its recommendation, it discusses whether or not group tax should 
be implemented in South Africa at this time.  
Included on the findings of the DTC, the report contained fundamental items128, which it believed need 
to be established in order to propose a comprehensive group tax system. Further discussion of this 
has been provided in chapter 9, the group tax proposal chapter.   
                                                            
124 Ibid. Page 108 
125 Ibid. Page 107 
126 PWC Tax Alert (April 2018): Davis Committee: Final reports and conclusion of work  
127 DTC Report: page 7 
128 Davis Tax Committee: Review of South Africa’s Corporate Income Tax System: March 2018. Page 78 to 83 
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5.4.2. ELECTION OF A GROUP TAX MODEL 
 
The DTC was of the view that if a full group tax system is introduced in South Africa, it should be 
implemented through the group relief model129. The DTC had an advantage over its predecessors in 
that the set of corporate rules had already been established. It was of the view that a provision to 
transfer losses between group entities would be a relatively simple addition to the existing corporate 
rules130.  
 
5.4.3. RECOMMENDATION OF THE REPORT 
 
The DTC has taken a conservative approach in its recommendation. While it has not denied the 
benefits group tax may have, it had expressed concerns on whether the economy, in its current state, 
will be able to handle the massive adjustment.  
It was concerned that group tax may have little effect in encouraging businesses and bringing about 
confidence due to other discouraging policies131. The DTC expressed concern of the country suffering 
a double knock as tax collection will be set to reduce while the country maintains its lack of business 
appetite due to other prevailing conditions and general lack of business confidence.  
The DTC had advised, however, that until such time that the economy is strong enough to cope with 
the drawbacks associated with group taxation, the tax system should, for now, rely on the corporate 
rules to provide corporate tax relief132.  
It needs to be noted that during the period in which DTC had produced their report, SARS’ revenue 
collection had been showing large deficits with its targets. The state of affairs of SARS, as will be 
discussed in chapter 9, has compromised tax collection133 this was seen during the 2017/2018 period 
treasury where had registered a R48.2bn shortfall in taxes134. These shortfalls which have been 
experienced in recent times were generally not the case during the periods in which the previous 
reports were published, as SARS was previously recognised to be an efficient organ of the state135.  
 
5.4.4. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 
The DTC has recognised the benefits that group taxation could bring to the economy of South Africa, 
however, was fearful that the possible drawbacks could be fatal to an unstable economy. The DTC 
report, thus, recommended that group tax should not be implemented until such time that the 
economy is able to withstand the associated drawbacks without exposing the country to critical 
adverse effects. 
                                                            
129 Ibid. Page 84 
130 Ibid. Page 85 
131 Ibid. Page 84 
132 Ibid. Page 85 
133 Nugent Commission Report: Page 15 
134 Tehillah Niselow (August 2018): SA Revenue Service Shortfall to blame for VAT hike – Treasury – Fin 24  
135 Nugent Commission Report: Pages 13 to 14     
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5.5. CONCLUSION 
 
Having completed the investigation into the findings of the three relevant Commissions of Inquiry who 
included in their reports attention to the topic of group tax in South Africa, it can be safely said that 
all of the reports have displayed positivity towards a group tax system in principle. There has been 
concern regarding its implementation based predominantly on the development stage South Africa 
finds itself in.  
For the Margo Commission and Davis Committee reports, the concerns of adverse effects to the 
country proved to be too great for them to recommend the immediate instatement of group tax. 
Conversely, the Katz Commission had believed that South Africa could not afford to lag behind other 
countries anymore and recommended in their report that group tax be implemented. Albeit with a 
gradual approach due to the concerns it shared with the Margo Commission and DTC. The DTC has, 
however, been more optimistic about the implementation of group tax in South Africa than the Margo 
Commission as it believes that group tax should be initiated when the economy is strong enough to 
absorb such change.  
It is interesting to note that the DTC report had been issued three decades after the Margo 
Commission report. While definite steps towards a group tax system had been taken through the 
implementation of the corporate rules, in these three decades the country has not managed to be 
deemed ready to instate a loss transfer mechanism.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6. PROFESSIONAL OPINION 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Following on from the previous chapter where formalised reports containing studies into group 
taxation were looked at, this chapter will explore the less formalised opinions of professionals derived 
from publicly available articles where the question of group tax in South Africa is delved into.   
The chapter aims to identify arguments of professionals in their personal capacities where they are 
not constrained by the views of other members. While it is acknowledged that these articles have 
been provided in different times and therefore differing contexts to that of the formalised reports in 
the previous chapter, they have nevertheless been deemed to provide valuable insight to the outcome 
of this dissertation.  
In the sections that follow, the author will provide a summary of the articles and extract information 
deemed to be valuable to the conclusion.  
 
6.2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN TAX SYSTEM: A NATION IN MICROCOSM 
 
6.2.1. BACKGROUND 
 
The first article to be discussed does not delve deeply into the question of group taxation. However, 
it has relevance to the dissertation in that it discusses the need for tax reform to play a role in assisting 
the development of the South African economy.  
The article was written by two of nine foreigners that were invited by the newly elected democratic 
government to South Africa in 1995. They were invited to a workshop that was aimed at advancing 
tax reform systems that South African legislation could explore that could benefit the South African 
economy136.  
Admittedly, this article is almost 24 years old, however, it remains relevant since many of the of the 
issues prevalent at the time of issue are still prevalent today. The article had provided a tax strategy 
for economic improvement that, had it been implemented at the time, may have resulted in a different 
present scenario. The strategy provided, even though 24 years old, may still be useful for 
implementation today.   
 
 
                                                            
136 Aaron, H and Slemrod, J (1999) – The South African Tax System: A Nation in Microcosm – Brookings – 
Accessed 11 October 2018: Page 1 
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6.2.2. FINDINGS 
 
The article indicates that participants of the workshop had identified a few key strategies that it 
believed, at the time, may have led to resolving some the economic issues prevalent in South Africa.  
As submitted by the article, SARS had identified the complexity of tax legislation as a major threat to 
its ability to collect revenue137. As a result of this, the workshop agreed that in the short‐run, legislators 
should look to maintaining simple rules138 that would allow a greater portion of the population to 
understand and participate in it.  Attention should be directed at improving literacy and general 
education levels as the workshop believed it would bring with it economic development.  
In the medium to long term, efforts should be directed at improving the administrative capabilities of 
SARS and its staff139.  
With the pressure of international tax competition in mind, legislators should find balance between 
revenue collection and maintaining competitiveness with other jurisdictions. In this regard, the 
workshop believed that South Africa should look to moving towards a consolidated group tax system 
as a defence mechanism to avoid the shifting of incomes out of the South African tax net to more tax 
favourable destinations140.  
The article went on further to acknowledge the importance of tax policy reform in sustaining the multi‐
racial democracy in South Africa. The workshop was of the opinion that, given the low average income 
per capita levels at the time, real improvements to the development of the economy would need to 
be derived from broad‐based economic growth and should not be dependent only on redistribution 
as a means of reform141.  Further to this, the article acknowledged the tough task that all developing 
countries have in promoting economic growth using the very limited resources at their disposal142.  
 
6.2.3. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 
As noted above, the authors’ views are that the development of the economy should stem from broad‐
based economic growth. This translates into an opinion that instead of relying on redistribution to 
combat low income per capita levels, participation in economic activity should be more inclusive.  
This aligns to one of the objectives intended to be achieved by this dissertation’s group tax proposal, 
which is aimed at growing and developing smaller businesses through tax provisions.  
The article acknowledged that developing countries need to maximise their revenue collection in 
order to see to the needs of the country. With that being said, the article nevertheless recommended 
that a group tax system be implemented in the long‐run.   
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140 Ibid. Page 13 
141 Ibid. Page 14 
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6.3. SAICA NEWS: FULL GROUP TAX SYSTEM IMPERATIVE IN CURRENT ECONOMIC 
MELTDOWN 
 
6.3.1. OVERVIEW 
 
This article143, in which Deborah Tickle144 is quoted, was published around 10 years ago in May 2009 
around the time of the infamous recession. Negative effects of the recession, where economic 
instability had become prevalent, had been felt globally.  
As a result of the tough economic times, many companies found themselves in loss suffering positions. 
As noted in the article, this provided for some sort of relief in that "A tax loss can, in a small way, bring 
some relief to a firm's cash flow in that it would no longer have to pay income tax three times a year, 
since the taxable income it generates is offset by its tax loss. The big caveat to this statement is that 
many companies do not operate in isolation but are part of a group of companies"145. 
Current legislation dictates that only the company that has sustained the loss may utilize the loss in 
offsetting its future profits for tax purposes. In a group scenario, there may be companies making a 
profit and some who are showing losses. In order to sustain the operations of the group, “loss‐making 
companies in a group are often funded by their profitable peers, with, however, the latter receiving 
no resultant tax benefit”146. 
 
In order for profit making trades to benefit from losses incurred from other trades, these trades would 
need to all trade under a single divisionalised company. Companies separate themselves into smaller 
companies as part of a group to derive commercial benefits and to manage risk through limited 
liability. The article states that, “although the ownership in groups is almost the same as if the group 
were one company, tax laws prohibit the cross‐utilization of tax losses”147.   
 
6.3.2. GROUP TAX VIEW 
 
This scenario is not unique to South Africa. Other countries, however, have implemented a system of 
group tax that allows loss transfer between entities in a group structure. South Africa has not 
introduced a profit and loss offsetting provision into its legislation with a possible reason being that 
of the potential cost to the fiscus it may cause148.  
Tickle stated that, “drastic measures are sometimes required in drastic times. The cost to the fiscus of 
losing some of the taxpayer groups altogether ‐ because tax is being extracted from the better 
businesses, whilst others in the group are dragging it down ‐ may be higher in the long run." 
                                                            
143 Tickle, D, (2009) – Full group tax system imperative in current economic meltdown. Page 1 – SAICA 
Communique News Service – Accessed 11 October 2018 
144 Deborah Tickle is a respected Tax Practitioner and a member of SAICA and the DTC 
145 Tickle, D, (2009) – Full group tax system imperative in current economic meltdown. Page 1 – SAICA 
Communique News Service – Accessed 11 October 2018 
146 Ibid. Page 1 
147 Ibid. Page 1 
148 Ibid. Page 2 
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The article concludes implying favour to the instatement of a group tax system declaring that 
"Ultimately, the severity of the economic downturn strongly suggests that the time is right for 
Treasury to reconsider South Africa's current group rationalization provisions and move them up to 
the next level of full group taxation."149.  
 
6.3.3. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 
While the author has not attempted to draw similarities between the current economic climate and 
the climate in which the article was published, it is clear to note that the view of the article is that 
group tax could be instated in times of economic distress. In fact, the article has gone as far as stating 
that, “the ability to cross‐utilize the losses could be critical to the group's survival." This emphasizes 
the need for group tax during tough economic conditions.  
The article supports the view that operating multiple trades under a single divisionalised entity may 
sometimes not be the best way to conduct business and has therefore acknowledged that group 
structures may be necessary.   
 
6.4. GROUP TAX: JUST A SMALL STEP AWAY 
 
6.4.1. OVERVIEW 
 
This is an article150 in which David Lermer151, a respected tax professional, was quoted. The article, 
that was published post 2010, deals with the question of group tax in South Africa from Lermer’s point 
of view.  
Lermer had expressed his admiration towards South African tax legislators together with the revenue 
services for what they had managed to do, “what South Africa managed to do in a few years took 
others several decades.” This was with reference to the provisions provided by the corporate 
rules.  
With the above corporate rules in place, Lermer still believed that there are two areas still in need of 
attention, namely: 
1. Group tax in South Africa; and 
2. the potential group tax holds for interest relief on the acquisition of shares152.   
He believed that, “The absence of these provisions has put South African business at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to their international rivals”. In his opinion, many tenders had already been 
                                                            
149 Ibid. Page 3 
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lost due to the less favourable tax treatment provided in South Africa in comparison to its 
counterparts153.  
 
6.4.2. GROUP TAX VIEW 
 
Similar to the previous article with reference to group tax, Lermer states that “current economic 
volatility suggested it was surely time to revisit these key tax reliefs”. He believed that current tax 
treatment of groups has caused a “mismatch between economic and fiscal realities”. Companies in a 
group are taxed in their individual capacities whereas in reality the group operates as a single 
interdependent operating entity154.  
While Lermer was of the view that group taxation and its associated reliefs should be revisited in tough 
economic times, he too noted, however, that there are potential drawbacks of the system. His 
concerns, as provided below, are in line with those already discussed in this dissertation: 
 The complexity that a group tax system may bring to South African tax legislation and practice 
thereof 
 The cost that it may have to the fiscus in terms of revenue collection 
 The need for additional anti‐avoidance measures to combat potential abuse of relief 
provisions155 
In line with the more recently published DTC report156, Lermer expressed favour towards a group relief 
model of group tax. He stated that, “Looking at the road South Africa has already travelled over the 
past decade, the UK group relief approach seems the most appropriate way forward”157.  
Further to the provisions of the corporate rules, Lermer states that, “The only major further step 
necessary to convert to a UK style group relief system is the transfer of losses between group 
entities158. 
 
6.4.3. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 
Similar to the previous article, this article has expressed favour to revisiting the idea of group tax in 
South Africa during volatile economic times. Again, the author has not attempted to draw similarities 
between current economic volatility and the volatility experienced at the time the article was 
published. The article has been cited to draw further emphasis of the view that group tax could be 
implemented during economic volatility.  
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With regard to the model of implementation, there is agreement between this article and the DTC 
report in the belief that the group relief model would be the most appropriate, given the path already 
taken by tax legislation.  
Further to the above, the article echoes concerns previously noted in this dissertation regarding the 
complexity a group tax system and the loss to fiscus it may bring.  
 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
 
The first article, although not providing an in‐depth analysis on group taxation, has provided some 
important thoughts that may be of benefit to this dissertation. It provides for an outside (foreign) view 
of the tax system in South Africa. What stands out, as submitted by the author, is the article’s opinion 
on the importance of tax policy in sustaining the multi‐racial democracy in South Africa. The author 
shares the view of the article in that it believes that economic reform cannot only be derived through 
redistribution of wealth, but through broad‐based economic growth that encourages participation of 
those in need of reform. Further to this, the article recommended that South Africa should move 
towards a consolidation group tax system.     
Concerns relating to the complexity that a group tax system may bring to the tax system as well as the 
likely reduction in revenue collection has been expressed in this chapter as well.  
Of significance in this chapter, however, is the seemingly contrasting views of two of the articles with 
the recently published DTC report. The above articles have expressed favour to the view that under 
tough economic conditions, the implementation of a group tax system could provide much needed 
relief to businesses struggling in tough economic conditions. The DTC, as provided in their 
recommendations, were of the view that loss sharing should only be implemented at a point where 
the economy is stable enough to handle the change.  
However, as pointed out in chapter 5 under the DTC section, there had been large shortfalls in SARS’ 
revenue collection, relating to the state of affairs at SARS, during the period in which the DTC were 
compiling their findings which had been generally unprecedented during the periods that the articles 
discussed in this chapter had been written. This may provide for the rationale in difference of opinion 
between the articles in this chapter and the recommendations provided by the DTC report.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7. GROUP TAX PROVISIONS – AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Group tax has been implemented in many countries across the world. These countries are 
predominantly the more developed countries. In this chapter, the author will delve into the 
implementation mechanics of how some of these countries implement group tax into their tax 
systems.  
These mechanics will be used to assist in drafting the mechanics of the proposal in this chapter. The 
following countries have been selected as part of the research investigation whose findings will be 
provided in the proposal later in this chapter.  
 The UK 
 The USA 
 
7.2. THE UK 
 
At this stage, it seems as though the group relief model would be most appropriate for South Africa 
given the tax legislative path already taken159. Chapters 5 and 6 have displayed strong evidence to 
suggest that with the instatement of the corporate rules into legislation, the group relief model of 
group tax would be the most appropriate given that a loss transfer provision could easily be added to 
it.  
The UK group tax system is an example of a mature group model. Further to this, there have been 
inferences drawn in the Lermer article regarding the appropriateness of the UK group tax system for 
implementation in South Africa as well as the similarities that exist between the UK tax legislation with 
South Africa’s160. For these reasons, the UK has been selected as part of this investigation to provide 
guidelines for the proposal. 
 
7.2.1. QUALIFYING GROUP REQUIREMENTS 
 
Parent Company  
The parent of the group can be any corporation, UK resident or not161.  
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Subsidiary Company 
For subsidiary companies to qualify for group tax they are required to have their income included in 
the tax net of the UK. This may include resident companies or foreign companies.  
The ownership requirements of the parent to its subsidiaries differ for the different provisions of 
group tax. 
In order for capital neutral transfer of capital assets to be achieved, the parent must directly or 
indirectly own 50% of the subsidiaries profit and assets on liquidation. Further to this, the parent must 
directly or indirectly own 75% of the ordinary share capital of the subsidiary162.  
Revenue losses can be transferred between group entities if the parent directly or indirectly owns 75% 
of the ordinary shares as well as the profits and assets of the relevant subsidiaries on liquidation163.  
It follows that in order for a group to qualify for full group tax in the UK, it would need to comprise a 
parent company (incorporated anywhere) with an ownership in at least one subsidiary, whose income 
must be included in the UK tax net, with a minimum shareholding of 75%.     
 
7.2.2. MECHANICS OF THE SYSTEM 
 
As alluded to by the qualifying group requirements above, the UK group tax system allows for the tax 
neutral transfer of assets between group companies as well as the ability to share losses. This may be 
between parent and subsidiaries or amongst subsidiaries themselves. Where a loss is transferred, the 
loss‐making entity surrenders its loss to a profit‐making company. The surrendered amount is claimed 
as a deduction in the return of the transferor company while an income is recognised in the transferee 
company.  
The UK group tax system allows for resident and, in some cases, non‐resident losses to transferred to 
other group entities164. Transfer of non‐resident losses are subject to qualifying criteria which are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Losses are only allowed to be transferred to the extent that the transferee company’s profit would be 
reduced to zero165.  
Pre‐group losses may not be used to offset profits of the group.  
Gains and losses incurred on the transfer of capital assets between entities in the same group are 
deferred until such time that the assets are transferred out of the group. To attain this rollover relief, 
the transferred assets are required to remain within the UK tax net.  
Where a company is dual listed, it may only claim relief that has not already been claimed in the other 
country166.  
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7.2.3. ELECTION 
 
For losses to be transferred, the loss‐making company needs to provide written consent to the 
revenue authority.  
Tax neutral transfer of assets between all qualifying entities in the group are automatic and 
compulsory167.   
 
7.2.4. TERM 
 
There is no minimum term for group relief in the UK168. 
 
7.2.5. TERMINATION OF THE GROUP 
 
A group effectively terminates when it no longer meets the qualifying group requirements. The effects 
of group termination are that any capital gains that were deferred as a result of being part of the group 
get triggered.  
Any unutilized losses remain with the company to which it belongs to be utilized in the future169.  
 
7.2.6. LEAVING THE GROUP 
 
If an entity leaves a group170, the entity will no longer be able to participate in the group tax reliefs 
associated with that group. Similar to the group termination, previously deferred capital gains are 
triggered upon exit. Any unutilized losses that have been accumulated by the leaving entity remain 
with the entity and may be utilized by it in the future171.  
 
7.2.7. TAX RETURN SUBMISSION 
 
Each entity within the group is required to submit its own tax returns on which tax will be calculated 
and must be paid. Inland Revenue may agree for companies within the group to pay taxes on behalf 
of another172 173.  
                                                            
167 Ibid. Pages 10 to 12 
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7.2.8. TAX LIABILITY 
 
Generally, each entity will be liable for their own tax affairs and cannot be held liable for the liability 
of other group entities should they default174. There are however circumstances where tax of a 
defaulting group member may be collected from other group members.  
 
7.2.9. FOREIGN ENTITY PARTICIPATION 
 
International group of companies can also be recognised for group relief if the 75% ownership 
requirement is satisfied. Group tax reliefs may apply to foreign entities subject to additional qualifying 
criteria which is not part of the scope of this dissertation and therefore not covered herein175.  
 
7.3. USA 
 
As noted in chapter 1 of this dissertation, reference was made to the desire to reduce the compliance 
requirements associated with groups through the implementation of group tax in South Africa. With 
the consolidation model, there is the opportunity to allow a single tax return submission by the parent 
company on behalf of the group to be submitted. The USA group tax system is an example of a working 
consolidation model.  
Further to this, the provisions provided in the USA group tax system seem to be well structured to 
limit the loss to its fiscus and allow for more certainty for revenue collection. For these reasons, the 
USA group tax system has been investigated.   
 
7.3.1. QUALIFYING GROUP REQUIREMENTS 
 
Parent Company  
In order for consolidation to apply, the parent must be a domestic corporation that is the ultimate 
parent company. This means that the share capital of the parent may not be 80% owned, directly or 
indirectly by another company that would be an eligible parent.  
Subsidiary Company  
Subsidiaries are required to be domestic corporations where at least 80% of the shareholding and 
voting rights are owned by the parent company.  
All group members are required to have the same tax years176. 
                                                            
174 Jones Day, Group Taxation: Pages 10 to 12 
175 Ibid. Pages 10 to 12 
176 Ibid. Pages 12 to 14 
45 
 
It follows that for a group to participate in the USA group consolidation tax, there needs to a domestic 
corporation with at least 80% ownership in at least one subsidiary.  
 
7.3.2. MECHANICS OF THE SYSTEM 
 
The consequences of a consolidation model of group tax is that the entire group of participating 
companies are seen as one unit for tax purposes177. This results in intra‐company transactions and 
more specifically, the internal transfer of assets, being disregarded for tax purposes until such time 
that those assets are transferred to outside parties.  
Profits and losses are consolidated at parent level which has the effect of offsetting group profits with 
group losses178. Losses that have been accrued to members prior to their participation in the group 
are disallowed to be offset against group profits. These losses may only be offset against the entities’ 
own future profits179.  
Similar to that of the UK legislation, where a corporation is resident in the US but also subject to tax 
in another jurisdiction, then, any losses incurred by that company are disallowed in so far as those 
losses may be allowed as a deduction in the other jurisdiction180.  
 
7.3.3. ELECTION 
 
Election must be made by the due date of the group parents tax return for the tax year in which 
consolidation is to be adopted, which is generally 9 months after the end of the fiscal year. For the 
first consolidated year, all group members to which it is to apply must sign a consent form formalising 
their agreement to consolidate.  
All qualifying subsidiaries are forced to form part of the group consolidation. This means an “all in” or 
“all out” approach181.  
 
7.3.4. TERM 
 
There is no minimum term for which a group may elect to participate in group taxation. Groups may 
voluntarily terminate their full participation in group taxation, however, they will need to complete 
consolidated returns until such time that their termination request is approved182.  
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7.3.5. TERMINATION OF THE GROUP 
 
Where the group ceases to meet the qualifying requirements of a group, mandatory termination of 
consolidation group tax will come into effect.    
Where a group terminates its participation in group taxation the following repercussions will take 
effect:  
 Gains or losses on intercompany transactions that were previously disregarded get 
recognised; 
 Entities will be required to submit individual tax returns; and 
 The utilization of unused net operating losses and capital loss carry overs become subject 
to limitations 
 
7.3.6. LEAVING THE GROUP 
 
A group member may only leave the group if the requirements of the group cease to be met. The 
groups may remain intact for purposes of group tax unless the leaving group is the parent of the group. 
Upon leaving the group, previously deferred capital gains may be triggered183.  
If a group member ceases to be a member then the corporation may not be included in any 
consolidated return filed by the group or by any other tax group having the same common parent 
before the 61st month (5 year) after the first year in which the company ceased to be a member184.  
 
7.3.7. TAX RETURN SUBMISSION 
 
The group is required to submit a single tax return by the parent on behalf of the consolidated 
group185. 
 
7.3.8. TAX LIABILITY 
 
Tax liability of the group becomes payable by the parent company; however, the members may be 
held jointly and severally liable for the entire consolidated tax liability should the parent default186.  
Funds may be transferred to the parent company through normal consolidation rules to fund the tax 
liability of the group.   
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7.3.9. FOREIGN ENTITY PARTICIPATION 
 
There is no provision for foreign entity involvement in the US group tax system187.   
 
7.4. KEY TAKE‐AWAYS 
 
From the above analysis of the two countries and their respective group tax systems, there are some 
key features that stand out.  
 Both of the countries investigated have provisions within their group tax systems which allow 
for loss sharing and tax neutral transfer of assets between group members.  
 100% ownership in subsidiaries are not required, however, substantial control is.  
 There is a consensus to disallow the use of pre‐group accumulated losses. 
 There are consequences of leaving the group or ceasing to participate in group tax. The result 
of which is that it may trigger tax consequences of previously deferred taxes. 
 No minimum participation period has been prescribed  
 The UK group tax system allows for foreign participation, while the USA system limits 
participation to domestic entities.  
 It is noted that neither of the countries investigated have placed ownership or turnover 
limitations on participating groups.  
These take‐aways will be used to assist in the author’s drafting of a group tax proposal for South Africa 
in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 8 
8. GROUP TAX PROPOSAL 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Group tax, as discussed in chapter 3, is a system whereby groups are taxed on a more unified approach 
as opposed to their members being treated and taxed independently. This results in various tax reliefs 
with the most prominent one being that of profit and loss off‐setting for tax purposes.  
This chapter will set out a proposed tax system, based on a set of pre‐determined objectives, which it 
will aim to achieve as well as the research contained in the preceding chapters. The focus of this 
proposal will be to set out a group tax system for tightly‐held groups of companies in South Africa. 
This, however, does not imply that the system will be more beneficial to tightly‐held groups over any 
other groups. The rationale for focusing on tightly‐held groups will be expanded on later in the 
chapter. 
The conclusion will contain a summarised assessment of the proposal based on the objectives it set 
out o achieve.  
   
8.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROPOSAL 
 
The objectives of group tax, as identified in chapter 3, generally comprise of two key reliefs provided 
to participating corporate groups.  
1. The allowance for profits to be offset by losses between group member entities 
2. The tax neutral movement of assets between members of a group.  
While the above objectives are fundamental to a group tax system, this proposal will attempt to go 
beyond that and attempt to be creative in instating a system that will also look to encourage 
development and growth in tightly‐held businesses through tax policy. 
These objectives have already been provided in chapter 1 under the research question, however, they 
are restated below for completeness and ease of reference: 
 Encourage group formation through reduced compliance requirements and favourable taxing 
conditions; 
 Encourage business activity by providing more favourable conditions in which to conduct 
business; 
 Encourage and promote the longevity of businesses; 
 Provide South Africa with an entry into group taxation without over‐exposing the fiscus to a 
reduction in revenue collection 
The objectives, as stated above, will be aimed to be achieved for tightly‐held groups of companies 
participating in the proposed group tax system.  
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8.3. GROUP TAX PROPOSAL 
 
8.3.1. WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE A GROUP 
 
A group for the purposes of this proposal should be a tightly‐held group as defined in chapter 2.  
 
8.3.1.1. RATIONALE FOR TIGHTLY-HELD GROUPS 
 
The author acknowledges the possible benefits that a group tax system may have to businesses and 
the economy of South Africa. However, it also understands the potential drawbacks that are 
associated with group tax.  
The main drawbacks, as identified through the research include: 
 The potential loss to fiscus due to the increased tax relief provided to taxpayers 
 The difficulty of SARS and tax practitioners to implement a new tax system 
With the above in mind, the author has selected tightly‐held groups, together with their qualifying 
criteria stated below, to be the initial audience of a group tax system in South Africa. The limited 
audience has the effect of limiting the exposure of the fiscus to reductions in its revenue collection.  
Further to this, as stated upfront, this proposal aims to encourage and develop small businesses and 
has thus elected to focus group tax and its associated benefits and reliefs on these businesses.  
 
8.3.2. QUALIFYING CRITERIA 
 
Where a group of companies meets the requirements of a tightly‐held group as defined in this 
dissertation, they may be able to participate in group tax should the group meet the below qualifying 
criteria.  
 
8.3.2.1. PARENT REQUIREMENTS 
 
The parent company is required to be the ultimate parent of the group. In terms of section 41, to 
which the group definition of this proposal is based, all companies within the group are required to be 
South African registered and resident companies whose income falls within the tax net of South Africa.  
The requirements of the USA provision are similarly limited to domestic corporations188. This is 
opposed to the UK provision that allows any corporation to the parent of the group – domestic or 
foreign189. The approach taken by the USA provision has been favoured for use in this proposal as the 
author is not looking to propose foreign inclusion in group tax.   
                                                            
188 John Day, Group Taxation: Page 12 
189 Ibid. Page 10 
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8.3.2.2. SUBSIDIARY REQUIREMENTS 
 
In order for subsidiaries to qualify to form part of the group for purposes of this proposal, the parent 
is required to meet the following shareholding requirements in group members.  
Shareholding in subsidiaries are required to meet the requirements as set out in section 41 of the Act 
as detailed in chapter 2. Careful consideration, of which the rationale is discussed below, has been 
given to requiring subsidiaries to be wholly owned by the parent, however, the author has decided 
against this. Instead, the following ownership criteria of subsidiary are required: 
a) 100% ownership by the parent company; OR 
b) At least 70% ownership by the parent company with the remaining equity shareholding to be 
held by a direct family member as defined.  
The rationale for this is that, as noted in chapter 2, a benefit of a group structure is that it allows direct 
shareholding for minority shareholders in certain trades (where conducted in separate group member 
entities) without the parent shareholders having to part with shares in the entire business.  
With this in mind, this proposal aims to provide for flexibility to shareholders who may wish to invite 
additional minority shareholders190 in specific entities without having to part with shares in the parent 
company. Shareholders may wish to invite additional shareholders to subsidiaries to meet capital 
requirements and to attract, motivate and hold onto key employees. These additional shareholders 
would be subject to the family shareholder requirements.    
The recommendation to include non‐wholly owned subsidiaries goes against the recommendation of 
the Katz Commission who recommended that only wholly owned subsidiaries be allowed to 
participate.  This was part of its recommendation of a gradual approach to a full group tax system.  
The subsidiary requirements are, however, in line with the requirements of the UK and USA group tax 
provisions which both allow non‐wholly owned subsidiaries to participate191. As is the case with this 
proposal, both these countries do however, require substantial control of the equity holding.  
 
8.3.2.3. GROUP TURNOVER 
 
The proposal will set a limitation of R20m on the annual combined turnover of the group to be allowed 
to participate in group tax. The turnover limit for individual participating entities is R5 million per 
entity.  
The limitation of R20m was chosen using the guidelines provided in the requirements for Small 
Business Corporations as defined in the tax Act192.  
It is noted that there is no turnover limitation placed on companies either the USA or the UK. However, 
the turnover limitation been proposed to limit the potential loss to fiscus as well as to focus relief on 
smaller businesses.  
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8.3.3. GROUP TAX IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Further to the above qualifying requirements, the DTC has provided the fundamental items193 that 
need to be established in order to propose a comprehensive group tax system. These items are 
provided below.  
 
8.3.3.1. GROUP TAX MODEL 
 
In line with one of the objectives of this proposal to reduce the compliance burden on participating 
groups, the ideal model of group tax implementation would have been the consolidation model. As 
noted in chapter 3, the consolidation model allows the parent of the group to submit a single tax 
return on behalf the participating members of the group. However, based on the research conducted 
in the previous chapters, the author has decided against proposing the consolidation model of group 
tax.  
As noted in chapter 5, where the Commissions of Inquiry were discussed, the Margo and Katz 
Commissions had eventually recommended that if group tax is to be implemented in South Africa it 
should be implemented via the consolidated model. The rationale for this conclusion was their view 
of the consolidation model being less complex than the group relief model. These reports were of 
course issued prior to the introduction of the corporate rules.  
Upon investigation into the DTC report, it became apparent, that a group relief model would be better 
suited to the current tax system in South Africa. The DTC report’s view was that the corporate rules 
seemed to have paved the way towards an eventual group relief group tax system whereby the 
transfer of losses between group entities would be a simple addition to the existing corporate rules.  
As noted in chapter 6, this view had been shared with a view in the professional opinion chapter where 
it had been stated that, “Looking at the road South Africa has already travelled over the past decade, 
the UK group relief approach seems the most appropriate way forward”194.  
The implementation of a group relief model of group tax poses a challenge to the proposal’s ability to 
allow a single tax return submission and thereby reduce the compliance requirements of participating 
groups.   
Further to this, a consolidation model of group tax would be counterproductive to what has already 
been achieved by tax legislation. The corporate rules have been noted to already allow for the tax 
neutral transfer of assets between group entities. A consolidated group tax system would add 
complexity and uncertainty regarding the application of the existing rules.  
For these reasons, the view of the DTC report which recommends a group relief model of group tax 
has been accepted and supported by this dissertation. Albeit, at the expense of not being able to 
reduce the compliance requirements through single tax return submissions.  
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8.3.3.2. TAX LOSSES 
 
It is proposed that tax losses of group members would be allowed to be used to offset against group 
profits. The tax losses that may be used to offset profits would however, be limited to: 
 losses incurred only from when the relevant member company had met the requirements of 
being part of the group in question 
 losses may only be utilized by the group such that they were accumulated after the group 
commenced participating in group taxation.  
Pre‐group tax and pre‐grouping losses may only be set off against the entities’ own future income. 
This has been deemed to be a necessary complexity by the author, as it will limit the loss to the fiscus 
and discourage the trafficking of losses. Without this provision, groups may acquire companies that 
have an existing assessed loss in order to derive a tax benefit to the group in the future under a group 
tax system.    
The provision to limit the use of pre‐group and pre‐group tax losses, in determining group taxable 
income under a group tax system is in line with the provisions of the USA group tax legislation195.  
 
8.3.3.3. ASSET TRANSFER 
 
Similar to the provisions contained within the UK tax system196, the tax neutral transfer of assets within 
the group will not form part of the group tax provisions. Companies participating in group tax will 
continue to have access to the provisions of the corporate rules which, as noted in chapter 4, allows 
for the tax neutral transfer of assets between companies within the same group.  
It is proposed, however, that qualifying197 groups of companies have the anti‐avoidance provisions in 
section 45 relaxed to the extent that the 18‐month rule should not apply where companies transfer 
the assets within group between participating entities. This is to allow qualifying groups flexibility to 
position its assets in the most efficient manner within the group without the effects of adverse tax 
effects as a limitation.  
Concerns relating to the 18‐month anti‐avoidance rules have also been included in the DTC report198. 
It was submitted that “Taxpayers perceive the 18‐month anti‐avoidance rule as unnecessarily strict, 
unfair, and harsh and regard it as not contributing to fiscal neutrality199. The anti‐avoidance provision 
has also been criticized as being “too long and unrealistic in a modern world where business 
opportunities emerge at an accelerated pace”200.  
 
                                                            
195 Jones Day, Group Taxation: Page 13 
196 Omar, S (2009), Group taxation in South Africa – A contextual analysis. Page 21 
197 In terms of the qualifying criteria stated in this chapter to which groups may participate in group tax.  
198 The DTC Report: Page 58 and 59 
199 SN Middelmann A study of the applicability of a system of group taxation in South Africa. (2003). University 
of Pretoria.  
200 The DTC Report: Page 59 
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The UK intracompany provision contains a 6‐year de‐grouping anti‐avoidance provision, however, 
does not place limitations, through the triggering of tax consequences, on when the asset may be 
sold201.   
 
8.3.3.4. ELECTION 
 
In terms of the USA group tax provision, the parent company is required to elect on behalf of the group 
if it will be participating in group taxation. All eligible companies within the group are required to 
follow the parent’s election202. The UK does not have an election provision, however, requires the 
consent of the surrendering company to be submitted in writing to the revenue authority to allow its 
losses to be utilized by the receiving company. 
In order to maintain control of the participating companies, this proposal recommends that companies 
wishing to participate in the provisions of group tax are to submit their election to SARS together with 
supporting documentation confirming their conformance to the qualifying requirements.  
Non‐qualifying companies within the group would not disqualify the entire group from group taxation 
unless the group’s turnover limitation has been exceeded. In all other cases, qualifying companies may 
participate while non‐qualifying companies would be required to follow normal corporate tax 
legislation.   
Election is to be made not less than 3 months prior to due date of the companies’ annual tax return 
submission.  
 
8.3.3.5. TERM 
 
Once election is made by the parent on behalf of the group to apply group taxation, they will be 
required to resubmit their election forms together with its supporting documents to confirm 
conformance with the participating requirements.   
The USA provision allows the automatic re‐election of group tax for subsequent years. However, due 
to the stringent participation requirements of this proposal, the author is of the view that companies 
could easily fall out of the allowable participation requirements. To avoid having companies slip 
through and continue to unduly benefit from group tax provisions, the author recommends annual re‐
election.  
As was the case with initial election, re‐election should be required not less than 3 months prior to 
the due date of the companies’ annual tax return submission.  
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8.3.3.6. TERMINATION OF GROUP TAX 
 
Group tax would be terminated for the following reasons: 
 Where a group no longer meets the requirements of the group tax provision 
 Where a company is no longer part of the participating group 
Where the group tax is terminated as a result of the reasons stated above, the member companies 
will be required to revert back to conventional tax laws.  
Where termination occurs as a result of de‐grouping, standard anti‐avoidance provisions will be 
applicable in terms of the corporate rules. This includes the realization of capital gains that had been 
deferred as a result of it being an intra group transaction. This is the case with the UK and USA group 
tax provisions203.   
Any unutilized accumulated losses available on termination will only be available for use by the 
relevant company to which it belongs.  
 
8.3.3.7. TAX RETURN SUBMISSION 
 
Ideally, the author would have liked to have proposed a single tax return submission on behalf of the 
group to reduce compliance requirements as is the case with the USA204. However, this would not 
have been appropriate given that the proposal has recommended a group relief model of group tax.  
The proposal therefore follows the UK provision which requires each participating to submit its own 
tax returns after taking into account any loss transfer that had occurred within its books205. It has thus 
been conceded that the proposal would not be able to reduce compliance requirements in terms of a 
single tax return submission for the group.  
 
8.3.3.8. TAX LIABILITY 
 
Tax liability will be calculated and payable on each tax return submission by the relevant participating 
companies. Other group companies may be allowed to pay taxes on behalf of other group entities206.  
The UK provision states that group members are not jointly and severally liable for aggregate group 
tax liabilities but are only liable for their own tax affairs207. This is different to the USA provision that 
holds each member entity jointly and severally liable for the entire liability of the group208.  
                                                            
203 John Day, Group Taxation: Pages 12 and 13 
204 Ibid, Page 14 
205 Ibid. Page 12 
206 This is to allow for cases where profits have been transferred to struggling entities that would be unable to 
fund tax payments.  
207 Ibid. Page 12 
208 Ibid. Page 14 
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To protect the fiscus, it is proposed that upon failure by a participating company to settle is tax liability, 
SARS may hold the participating companies liable to the extent of the taxes that they would have had 
to pay had they not participated in the group tax provision.   
 
8.4. CONCLUSION 
 
The proposal set out above has attempted to meet a set of stated objectives aimed at developing and 
growing small businesses. The proposed group tax system is to follow the group relief model whereby 
group entities would be allowed to transfer their assessed losses between each other. This would be 
coupled with the existing set of corporate rules, which as seen in chapter 4, allows for the tax neutral 
transfer of assets between entities within the same group. These reliefs, together, satisfy the core 
objectives of a group tax system as identified in 8.2 above.  
In addition to the core objectives noted above, the proposal aimed to achieve a set of secondary 
objectives focused on developing and growing small businesses.  
It is the opinion of the author, that the implementation of a group tax system would encourage the 
formation of group structures. This would be achieved through the reliefs provided by the proposed 
system together with the benefits of groups discussed in chapter 2. together, this would improve on 
the current conditions in which to conduct business. Participating businesses would be buoyed with 
the peace of mind knowing that risks of new ventures could be separated while any losses incurred 
could be used to offset profits of their other operations.  The separation of risks also improves the 
longevity outlook of a business as the remaining operations are unaffected should a separated trade 
find itself in financial difficulty.  
The proposal has set out strict qualifying criteria which limit the participation in it. As noted previously 
in this dissertation, a drawback of group tax is the potential reduction in revenue collection for the 
fiscus as relief is provided to taxpayers. This becomes especially important for developing countries 
that need to maximize their tax collection to see to the needs of the country.   
Further to this, the limitations applied by the proposal which limits the qualifying audience, has the 
effect of focusing the potential reliefs and benefits of the proposal on smaller businesses.   
Included in the objectives aimed to be achieved by the proposal was to propose a system that would 
result in a reduction in compliance requirements for businesses that participate in it. As noted in 
8.3.3.1. above this objective has been hindered by strong evidence to suggest that a group relief model 
would be better suited. As a result of this, qualifying businesses would need to accept the benefits 
associated with groups together with the reliefs that would be provided under the proposed system 
as sufficient encouragement to form group structures.   
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CHAPTER 9 
 
9. NUGENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout the research conducted into group tax thus far, there has been a common concern 
relating to the complexities of a group tax system and the ability of SARS to be able to maintain it. As 
stated in the DTC report, one of the reasons that group tax not been implemented in South Africa is 
due to inadequate resources at SARS209. However, there have also been arguments that SARS has 
reorganised itself in the past 10 years and that it is capable of handling group tax.  
Fortunately, for the purposes of this dissertation, there has been a Commission set up in order to 
assess the current position of SARS. What follows in this chapter is the findings of the interim report 
of this Commission which will provide clarity on the ability of SARS to adequately transition the current 
tax legislation towards a group tax system.  
 
9.2. BACKGROUND  
 
In his State of the Nation address, President Cyril Ramaphosa committed to taking steps to stabilise 
SARS, restore its credibility and strengthen its capacity to meet revenue targets. In this regard, on 23 
May 2018, the President appointed a Commission of Inquiry into tax administration and governance 
in the South African Revenue Services (the Commission210)211.  
The Commission is chaired by retired Justice Robert Nugent. Professor Michael Katz, Advocate 
Mabongi and Mr Vuyo Kahla are assisting him. The Commission was mandated, in summary, to provide 
an analysis of the current state of SARS and to provide recommendations for improvement should it 
be required212. In this regard, the Commission released an interim report titled, Commission of Inquiry 
into the Tax Administration and Governance by the South African Revenue (the report) Service on 27 
September 2018213.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
209 DTC report: Page 78 
210 This short‐hand is limited to use chapter 9 when referring to the Nugent Commission 
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212 Ibid. Page 1 
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9.3. FINDINGS 
 
The Commission was deeply concerned about the current state of affairs at SARS. The concerns as 
provided by the report are summarised below214. 
 
9.3.1. CURRENT STATE OF SARS 
 
On the instatement of Mr Moyane as Commissioner of SARS there has been a halt in the development 
of information technology (IT) systems. This has led to the degeneration of SARS’ IT infrastructure. A 
submission from an IT company contracted to provide an assessment of SARS’ IT systems painted a 
dim view in declaring that SARS’ IT systems were in disarray215. 
Further to this, there have been around 200 employees in managerial positions that have been 
removed from their posts and moved into positions of lesser importance and effect. This has led to 
the resignation and wastage of expertise of key personnel at SARS216.   
SARS has shown a lack of cohesion with other key state organs such as Treasury, the Auditor General, 
the Davis Tax Committee and the Financial Intelligence Centre. SARS’ reputation is far from ideal due 
to media reports which are largely seen to be true217.  
The Commission has expressed concern about the senior management at SARS that have allowed the 
state of affairs at SARS under Mr Moyane to have deteriorated to such a degree. In 2014, Mr Moyane 
disbanded the Executive Committee (EXCO) of SARS on the grounds of unconfirmed allegations of the 
infamous rogue unit that was allegedly operating within SARS. In 2015, Mr Moyane acted to reinstate 
the EXCO by appointing new personnel to the committee. Only two of the new appointees were 
selected from within SARS. The rest were brought in from outside with little to no experience in tax 
collection. By 2017, the two employees brought in to the EXCO from within SARS were no longer in 
those positions. This resulted in the wealth of knowledge and experience of the pre‐Moyane era to 
have been completely eradicated in the EXCO218.  
“The air at SARS reeks of intrigue, fear, distrust and suspicion”219. This is quoted directly from the 
interim report issued by the Nugent Commission which points to an institution that has fallen to well 
beneath where it should be in terms of its integrity and capabilities.  
 
9.3.2. FORMER STATE OF SARS 
 
Prior to Mr Moyane taking office at SARS as the Commissioner, SARS was proving itself to be a 
competent organ of the state earning itself accolades domestically and internationally. The model 
adopted by SARS at the time was based on three legs: 
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1. Education 
2. Service  
3. Enforcement220 
The organisation was structured to meet the objectives of reversing non‐compliance with tax laws. 
SARS had implemented the IT system that is currently still being utilized today to move away from 
manual paper systems which improved efficiency for SARS and taxpayers alike.  
The online system made data capturing easier allowing analysis for trends to be observed which 
provided an improved basis on which revenue planning could be conducted. There were measures in 
place to combat illicit trades which had the potential to deny SARS their share of revenue collection.  
Employees were generally behind the ethos of what SARS should represent which provided for a 
vibrant and dedicated environment that was efficient and continuously improving in what they were 
set out to do221.  
The state at SARS at the time had led the DTC and industry professionals to applaud the strides that 
SARS had taken to become one of the more efficient organs of the state.  
Under the leadership of Mr Moyane, however, this has all since been eroded and the once competent 
organ of the state is now in dire need of revitalisation222.  
The degeneration of SARS has compromised the ability of SARS to correctly collect revenue to the 
benefit of delinquent taxpayers and illicit trades223.  
 
9.4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Commission identified SARS as an institution that is vital to the welfare of the country. It is an 
organisation that controls the flow of more than R1 trillion in revenue collection through the year and 
is thus vulnerable to corruption.  For this reason, SARS requires leadership and staff of the highest 
quality and integrity to manage the organisation. Proper governance of SARS is required which 
requires an amendment of the legislation that governs it. In order for SARS to operate at optimum 
efficiency for its mandated purposes, it requires long‐term certainty and stability which is currently 
not present224.  
The effectiveness of tax administration is achievable through the use of up‐to‐date IT systems. As 
noted above, SARS’ IT systems are in disarray and in need of attention225. This, together with the 
findings stated above have resulted in the poor position that SARS currently finds itself in.  
The interim report identified two key recommendations that should be affected immediately, without 
which, the poor performance and levels of operations of SARS are set to continue.  
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The recommendations are: 
1. The President needs to take steps without delay to remove the current Commissioner of 
SARS, Mr Tom Moyane, from office.  
2. The President needs to take steps without delay to appoint a new Commissioner of SARS226. 
The Commission has cautioned, worryingly, that the removal of Mr Moyane and the instatement of a 
new Commissioner at SARS is only but the first step on the road to recovery. The remaining steps to 
follow are to be outlined in the final report227.  
 
9.5. CONCLUSION 
 
What has transpired subsequent to the release of the interim report, is that the President has acted 
on the recommendation of the Nugent Commission interim report and removed Mr Moyane from his 
position as Commissioner of SARS228.  
What can be seen from the findings of the interim report into the state of affairs of SARS is that SARS 
is currently in a state of disarray. The concerns of the Commissions of Inquiry discussed in the previous 
chapters regarding the complexity of a group tax system have been given extra significance based on 
the findings of the interim report contained in this chapter. The decision on whether or not to instate 
a group tax system needs to be viewed with this background in mind.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
10. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Through this dissertation, as provided in the research question, the author set out to determine 
whether or not it would be beneficial for South Africa to incorporate a group tax system into its 
legislation that will, initially, only be aimed at tightly‐held qualifying groups. In answering this 
question, an investigative process had been followed that provided arguments for and against 
instating group tax in South Africa. These findings had been used to propose a group tax proposal for 
South Africa and thereafter conclude on the research question as provided below in this chapter.   
Group tax is a system that provides tax relief to corporate entities that operate within a group of 
companies. Its core objectives are to allow flexibility of asset ownership through tax neutral transfers 
within the group as well as allowing the sharing of assessed losses between member entities.  
Admittedly, these core objectives of group tax can be achieved through conducting a multi‐trade 
business under a single divisionalised entity. This way, assets can be transferred from one division to 
another while losses of trades are offset with profits of the others. However, as noted in chapter 2 of 
this dissertation, there are strong business rationale that favour the necessity for group structures in 
conducting business. Further to this, there is widespread agreement that groups are necessary in 
conducting business as was seen in the Margo report, as well as the Tickle article reviewed in chapter 
6.  
Following on from the above, the view that group structures are necessary and sometimes required 
to promote business has been accepted. This is based on the key benefit of groups, as discussed in 
chapter 2, which provide limited liability that separates the risks of entities within a group. The 
limitation of risk protects the operations and asset base of other trades, should a trade find itself in 
financial difficulty. This provides for potential increased longevity of businesses while boosting 
investor confidence.  
Group tax, as identified in chapter 3, takes the benefits associated with groups a step further. It allows 
groups to be treated similarly to divisionalised entities for tax purposes, while granting businesses 
access to the benefits of groups. Under a group tax scenario, shareholders can be more confident in 
expanding their businesses through the addition of trades knowing that, firstly the risks could be 
separated and secondly, any losses incurred could be offset against profits from the other group 
entities. This, together with the other benefits discussed through the dissertation, champion the 
argument for group tax to be implemented.   
As set out in chapter 4, the current corporate rules cater for the tax neutral transfer of assets between 
group entities, however, there does not exist any provisions that allow losses to be shared between 
group member entities. It was thus concluded, that current legislation contains elements of group tax 
in that it allows for assets to be transferred tax neutrally between corporate group members, 
however, lacks any form of loss sharing provisions. In fact, legislation, through its anti‐avoidance 
measures, actively prohibits the sharing of losses between corporate entities.   
After investigating the Commissions of Inquiry that had included in their reports, recommendations 
regarding group tax, a common theme has been found. Concerns relating to the likely reduction in 
revenue collection to the fiscus and the complexity of the system had been key concerns that resulted 
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in two of the three reports (Margo Commission and DTC reports) investigated, having recommended 
against the implementation of group tax at the time of reporting. These concerns have been identified 
as possible reasons as to why group tax has not already been instated.  
The most recent of the Commissions of Inquiry, and as a result probably the most relevant, was the 
DTC report. The DTC report suggested in its recommendations that group tax should not be entered 
into until such time that the economy is strong enough to withstand its potential drawbacks. This view 
seemed to contrast with the opinions of professionals expressed in publicly published articles in which 
it was indicated that group tax was seen as a necessity during tough economic times as a means to 
promote the survival of tax paying entities.  
Rationale for this was however noted, as during the period in which the DTC conducted their work, 
SARS had been in a poor state of affairs which had compromised revenue collection. Nevertheless, it 
was drawn from the articles provided in chapter 6, that group tax could be instated during tough 
economic periods as a means to provide relief to businesses.  
An investigation was conducted into the mechanics of the UK group relief system as well as the USA 
consolidation system. The findings provided useful guidelines in drafting a proposal with the UK 
system providing insight into the group relief model and the USA legislation providing mechanisms 
that limit losses and uncertainty to the fiscus. These findings were combined and adapted to the 
proposal drafted in this dissertation, as set out in chapter 8.  
The proposal, in chapter 8, has set out to achieve a set of goals which included the core objectives of 
a group tax system. As alluded to in the research question, the proposal aims to provide for a group 
tax system for tightly‐held groups as defined in chapter 2.   The rationale for electing tightly‐held 
groups of companies as the beneficiaries of group tax relief is two‐fold: to encourage development 
and growth in the smaller businesses while simultaneously limiting the possible adverse effects 
associated with group tax, in particular the impact on revenue collection. 
The proposal’s limiting participation criteria have the effect of focusing these improved business 
conditions and tax reliefs on the smaller businesses with the hope that it may stimulate growth and 
development of these businesses. Further to this, the limited participation, and hence limited loss to 
fiscus suggested by the group tax proposal is in line with the understanding that developing countries 
need to maximise revenue collection in order to tend to the maintenance of the country.  
The author of this dissertation opines that the proposal, as submitted in chapter 8, has achieved a 
middle ground between what is currently in place and a full‐on group tax system. Although, 
implemented differently, the proposal is in line with the view of the Katz Commission to take a gradual 
approach to group tax as well as an opinion contained within the DTC report that tax legislation should 
not be implemented bearing only revenue collection in mind but should take a long‐term view. “The 
tax cash outflow can, unnecessarily result in the demise of groups, essentially killing the goose that 
will lay the future golden egg for the fiscus”229.  
The author thus recommends that steps towards the implementation of group tax for tightly‐held 
groups of companies, as submitted in the proposal in chapter 8, should be taken.  
With the above being submitted, the author also bears in mind the current position of SARS as 
identified in the interim Nugent Commission report. In light of the current leadership and resource 
crisis in which SARS finds itself, it would seem reckless to implement a new system of this magnitude. 
                                                            
229 DTC Report: Page 77 
62 
 
This is especially significant given the common agreement found through the research conducted that 
group tax would add great complexity to the current tax system. However, steps have been taken 
since the release of the interim Nugent report to resolve the issues identified. As has been 
acknowledged in the preceding chapters, SARS has previously shown itself to be an efficient organ of 
the state when under sound management.  
Based on the current position of SARS, it is submitted that the recommendation to implement a group 
tax system for tightly‐held groups of companies should be delayed until such time that SARS has re‐
established itself as an efficient organ of the state.  
 
AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
As identified in this dissertation, legislators in developing countries may be reluctant to implement a 
group tax system and offer loss sharing reliefs between group entities because of the resultant loss to 
fiscus that may occur.  
Consequently, further research has been identified that could be delved into to investigate the 
exposure of the fiscus to the various groupings of taxpayers that could be allowed participation in 
group tax.   
Having an idea of the possible exposure to an initial reduction in revenue collection for the fiscus may 
allow for adequate planning which could alleviate uncertainty and provide confidence to implement 
group tax.  
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